China’s bullying tactics and provocative statements about the situation in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) are commonly expressed through narratives that attempt to justify its fictitious 10-dash line claim. Based on erroneous historical justification combined with a “might is right” approach, Beijing’s storyline seems to follow Goebbel’s infamous dictum, “A lie told a thousand times becomes the truth”. Of course, this creates an untenable situation for the Philippines.
Experts and policy makers alike have attributed these actions to Beijing’s gray zone warfare, an approach that uses its national power (i.e. Political, Economic, Cultural, and Military) to intimidate or seek the acquiescence of adversaries without resorting to armed conflict. This strategy also underscores the importance of dominating cyberspace and mounting a persistent disinformation campaign to weaken the will of its adversaries. However, I believe that understanding Beijing’s intent and techniques must go beyond this simple construct. Being at the frontline of this war against reality demands a deeper understanding of its philosophy and how it operationalizes its cyber-enabled disinformation campaign.
For its philosophy, China views the digital information space as a venue for strategic competition and has allotted the necessary resources to dominate it. A 2021 study by the US-based RAND corporation revealed that it spends USD $10 billion per year on information operations. For its part, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sees the digital domain as a venue for modern warfare. As early as the 1990s, its aim to transform itself into an ‘informatized force’ was based on the belief that controlling the digital environment would ensure victory on the battlefield.
Malign Influence Strategy and the 3-warfares concept
Another important concern is how Beijing operationalizes its philosophy. We need to understand that this idea of information domination is part of a malign influence strategy that uses disinformation as a tool to sow discord and chaos against an adversary. This can happen as part of its gray zone warfare (non-kinetic) or to support combat (kinetic) operations. A 2018 Georgetown study cites the 3-warfares (3Ws) concept that comprises Beijing’s malign influence operations. The 3Ws is composed of the following phases: (1) Strategic Psychological Operations: This is composed of pre-conflict posturing using its military and paramilitary as well as other forms of national power to achieve its desired outcomes; (2) Media influence operations: Refers to the covert and overt media operations that uses traditional, social media as well as informal venues to influence a target audience; (3) Manipulation of the legal systems: This refers to the exploitation of national and international legal systems where it aims to constraint its adversaries and confuse legal precedence. In general, the 3Ws approach is seen as a component of Beijing’s soft power and can complement its political and diplomatic actions.
Another characteristic of its malign influence strategy is the convergence of offensive cyber and information operations. This integration implies that offensive cyber actions like cyber espionage (i.e. Stealing sensitive information,) and computer network attacks are combined with information operations (i.e. Disinformation, deception, psychological warfare, etc.). This combination is enabled by the ability of a malicious actor to gain access to sensitive data. It also uses artificial intelligence as well as big data techniques to allow micro-targeting and adversary behavior analytics.
Implications for the Philippines
Given the nature of Beijing’s disinformation playbook, it is therefore crucial for the Philippines to be cognizant of its insidious nature. The country’s adherence to a transparent and vigorous media response is commendable, but its reactive nature will only serve Beijing’s interests. The 3Ws approach offers us these insights and possible actions to mitigate its impact:
1. China’s information operation is strategic: This means that Beijing’s campaign is long-term, well-coordinated, and adequately resourced. Its intent is to achieve information domination. In general, its disinformation activities are part of a malign influence strategy, which aims to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Philippine society. Aside from presenting alternative realities about the WPS issue, I believe that this campaign will focus on the country’s economic difficulties and political divides as well as internal conflicts to sow discord and undermine government initiatives.
This implies that the country’s response should also be strategic and proactive. For instance, the Philippine narratives must not only present the WPS as a sovereignty issue, but also part of its blue economy. Locally, this will enable the strategy to adopt a whole of society approach by mobilizing local governments, fisherfolk communities, and NGOs to be part of the issue. Also, schools can include the creation and publication of digital content as part of student requirements in specific subjects.
On the international stage, this will allow the Philippines to present its own narrative apart from the popular geopolitical standoff between the West and China. Moreover, a blue economy argument will further strengthen the Philippines’ position due to its adherence to global norms.
2. Convergence of cyber and disinformation operations: Recent evidence shows that the surge in disinformation activities is consistent with the increase in cyberattacks. These attacks targeted the data repositories of health, law enforcement agencies among others. Similar experiences in other countries surmised that offensive cyber capabilities (i.e. Data theft, espionage, denial of services, etc.) are often accompanied by disinformation activities. This convergence allows the aggressor to do micro-targeting, behavior analytics, and capitalize on discontent.
For the Philippines, this implies that a collective cyber defense approach is necessary to recognize its vulnerabilities and the impact of such a campaign. A collective defense posture will enable the country to define its critical sectors, develop standards, and empower its citizens to protect itself against malicious cyber activities and disinformation. This collective posture should also encourage the country to be part of international initiatives and mobilize the private sector to address cyber-enabled disinformation campaigns.
3.Uncovering the malign influence-disinformation network: Studies show that social media is the preferred venue for malign influence campaigns. This is due to the changing population demographics and its dependence on the Internet. As the country with the highest internet usage in 2020 and 73 million social media users, the Philippines is in a vulnerable situation.
In addition, understanding how the 3Ws strategy is operationalized is crucial for the Philippines. For instance, understanding the role of the Chinese diaspora, affiliated institutes and local content creators is crucial in designing a strategic response against malign influence.
In summary, the Philippine response to the Chinese aggression in the WPS has given us a glimpse of the ferocity of Beijing’s malign influence campaign and disinformation operations. Its strategic nature is evidence of an elaborate plot that aims to weaken the country’s resolve through confusion and division. It is therefore crucial for the country to be proactive and adopt a multifaceted approach that will strengthen the Philippine position and enhance its capabilities.
[Photo by National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA), via Wikimedia Commons]
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
Sherwin E. Ona, PhD is an associate professor and former chairperson of the department of political science and development studies of De La Salle University, Philippines. He is a senior fellow of the Philippine Public Safety College and the Stratbase-Albert Del Rosario Institute. Dr. Ona is also a module director and lecturer on cyber defense policies at the National Defense College of the Philippines. Dr. Ona is an auxiliary officer of the Philippine Coast Guard with the rank of Commander.
