In the run-up to the historic first summit between the U.S. and North Korea on 12 June 2018, then-CIA Director Mike Pompeo, under President Donald Trump’s instruction, visited Pyongyang and met with Chairman Kim Jong Un. According to Pompeo, Kim said “I’m a father and I’m a husband. And I have children. And I don’t want my children to carry the nuclear weapon on their backs their whole lives.” Further, according to Moon Jae-in, the former South Korean President, Chairman Kim made similar remarks during their summit meeting on 27 April 2018. Of course, Chairman Kim’s words do not need to be taken at face value. Still, they suggest that North Korea might be open to negotiation over its nuclear weapons.
With this in mind, I would like to explore the possibility of North Korea’s denuclearization by considering the nature of the country’s nuclear program. I suggest that, if a comprehensive package deal ensuring regime survival is offered, North Korea may denuclearize. This is because, for North Korea, the nuclear program is not the goal itself, but the means of survival. Before discussing denuclearization, it is important to recognize that North Korea’s priority has been regime survival. This term “survival” refers to more than just the continuation of the regime. It also implies sustained economic development and prosperity in general. In other words, to persuade North Korea to denuclearize, stakeholders must offer a path to survival that does not depend on nuclear weapons.
North Korea’s Hostile Policy
North Korea’s nuclear program has several features: military (a powerful deterrent and spearhead for countering military imbalance), political (a key source of legitimacy and vital part of Chairman Kim’s byungjin policy), and international values (a means to pursue a hostile foreign policy and decisive bargaining chip). With the launch of the second Trump administration, let me focus on the international features.
The former President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev said, “foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy, and domestic policy is an embodiment of ideology.” There is a high probability that a country with a hostile ideology would most likely implement a hostile foreign policy. North Korea’s nuclear policy can be an example. The country has been pursuing a class struggle since its foundation on 8 September 1948. This effort was institutionalized when North Korea changed its People’s Democratic Constitution to the Socialist Constitution in 1972. Article 10 reads, “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [DPRK, or North Korea] implements the dictatorship of the proletariat and enforces the class line and the mass line.” The country’s most recent constitution, available in public, is a 2019 version. Article 12 reads, “The State shall adhere to the class line and strengthen the dictatorship of the people’s democracy.” North Korea’s Socialist Constitution suggests that the class struggle is encouraged throughout the society as a whole. “Even in professional organizations, educational programs are being carried out with a focus on instilling in all generations […] the principle of class struggle.”
Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Foreign Minister under Gorbachev, said that “coexistence […] is incompatible with class struggle.” This is what North Korea’s ideology and foreign policy are about. Pursuing the ideology of class struggle would revive the image of the enemy and justify repressions in and beyond the country. In this sense, by projecting the image of the enemy, the ideology along with a hostile foreign policy has allowed North Korea to forge national unity. As Chan Young Bang, an esteemed expert on North Korea, points out, “nuclear weapons are a means to execute North Korea’s belligerent foreign policy to maintain internal solidarity.”
North Korea’s Bargaining Chip
It is known that the term bargaining chip gained prominence in relation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the 1970s to curtail the manufacture of missiles carrying nuclear warheads. According to the U.S. Library of Congress, a bargaining chip means any military force, weapons system or the like, which a country would willingly downgrade or discard in return for concessions by a rival. As noted earlier, for North Korea, a nuclear program is not the goal, but rather the means of survival. That is why North Korea could discard its nuclear weapons in exchange for appropriate concessions from the U.S. or South Korea. This aspect has been clearly demonstrated at the 2018 summit between the U.S. and North Korea: Chairman Kim “reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization” under the condition that President Trump provides security guarantees to North Korea for peace and prosperity.
The Six-Party Talks agreement on 13 February 2007 also highlights the bargaining-chip nature of North Korea’s nuclear program: North Korea would take concrete actions to denuclearize. “In concert with these actions,” the relevant parties promised to offer emergency assistance to the country equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. At another round of the Six-Party Talks on 19 September 2005, North Korea stated that it would be committed to abandoning nuclear weapons and returning to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. In response, the U.S. affirmed that it “has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.” Looking further back to the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to halt its nuclear program, provided that, “The two sides [the U.S. and North Korea] will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.” Together with the aforementioned military and political nature, North Korea’s nuclear weapons have constituted an effective and decisive bargaining chip.
North Korea’s Chairman Kim
If I may go back to Director Pompeo’s and President Moon’s message, Chairman Kim’s words are significant. First, they literally indicate that he is willing to give up North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Chairman Kim demonstrated his determination and sincerity by presenting his personal and human aspect. Appealing to obligations toward future generations is an emotional and effective argument that politicians can employ. Second, they suggest that he is aware of the adverse effects of the nuclear program. If nuclear weapons had only beneficial impacts, he would have no reason to relinquish them under any circumstances. Chairman Kim is most likely aware of their negative aspects: for example, undermining the sustainability of the regime (by extracting all valuable resources) and hindering economic development (by reinforcing the regime’s hostile and rigid ideology). Third, Chairman Kim’s remarks suggest that he is concerned with the succession issue. By invoking the idea of future generations, he acknowledged that he cannot rule forever. He does not want North Korea’s next generation to inherit his achievement, which consolidated his legitimacy. He may prefer that future leaders garner their legitimacy by other means, such as sustained economic development.
President Trump has indicated several times this year that he is willing to see Chairman Kim again: on the first day of his second presidency, three days later in January, in February, and in March. But it is important to note that he has been highly unpredictable in his behaviors and policies. The only thing I can predict is President Trump’s unpredictability. In the case of North Korea, however, I strongly hope that his predictable unpredictability does not result in negative consequences.
[Photo by Kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons]
The views and opinions expressed in the article are those of the author.
Dr Sungju Park-Kang is a Research Fellow at the DPRK Strategic Research Center and Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at KIMEP University, Kazakhstan. Park-Kang is also Adjunct Professor at the Centre for East Asian Studies, University of Turku, Finland. He was formerly Assistant Professor of International Relations and Korean Studies at Leiden University, the Netherlands and at the University of Central Lancashire, UK.
