The annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was held virtually on July 4 with India as the host. Simultaneously South Africa hosted the Sherpa Meeting of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) from July 4-6. Both the meetings had one common factor – expansion of their respective groupings.
The SCO meeting saw Iran becoming the member and Belarus set to join in 2024. The BRICS meeting too focused on expansion of membership beyond the present number of five.
India welcomed Iran’s membership to the SCO focusing on how it could possibly strengthen the connectivity initiatives such as the Chabahar Port and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). However, India has approached the expansion of BRICS cautiously. A month back External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar termed expansion of BRICS as a work in progress and that India is looking at it with positive intent and an open mind.
India, as an enthusiastic proponent of multilateral world order, may justify its participation in the SCO and BRICS, apparently anti-West forums, as a necessity to engage with different sides. But the way these forums are shaping up could make India’s maneuvering within them challenging.
In case of the SCO, India’s stand on two issues pertaining to national security has placed it on a different side from other members. First, during the SCO Summit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi raised the issue of terrorism and how some member countries support terrorists and terror activities. This was a clear reference to Pakistan’s support to cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, and China shielding terrorists at international forums such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Second, in the Joint Declaration of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO, India did not support China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as it violates India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
India’s stand is unlikely to find any support from the SCO members. India initially joined the SCO due to proximity to Russia and to engage with the Central Asian countries. However, Russia’s influence has waned and India’s engagements with Central Asian countries, though increased outside of the SCO, are nowhere near China’s ties with the region. As such India is left with a limited space to secure its interests in this China-dominated grouping.
BRICS, with three SCO members – India, China and Russia, presents a similar picture. There are three issues of concerns for India within the BRICS. First, as regards to expansion, India is insisting on establishing well-defined criteria instead of mere recommendations from the existing members. Second, External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar put to rest speculation about BRICS currency saying that the focus is on strengthening national currency. This essentially goes against the de-dollarization narrative. Third, most of the countries seeking membership of BRICS have strong ties with China but not with India. Some examples are Argentina, Algeria, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Congo and Guinea-Bissau. Iran, another BRICS aspirant, is a close economic and strategic partner of China, but has limited engagements with India in the form of connectivity projects. Some other hopefuls for the BRICS membership include Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt with which India has close ties which have been built carefully over the years independent of the BRICS platform. The possible expansion of the BRICS makes it a China-dominated forum, similar to the SCO. With Russia’s diminished bargaining power, India remains isolated in the BRICS.
As much as accepting stakes of various countries in economic and strategic areas at regional and global level, China’s assertion has been a driving factor for India to strengthen its engagements with like-minded countries. While proposing multilateralism and an effective institutional mechanism responsive to the changing global order India has gone ahead in the past decade to focus on strengthening its bilateral ties as well.
India’s growing relations with the United States, Japan and Australia resulted in formation of the Quad to address the strategic and economic challenge posed by China in the Indo-Pacific Region. Security threat posed by China at the border and in the neighbourhood would always be India’s priority while engaging at multilateral forums. This makes Western and democratic countries India’s partners of choice at international level. The upswing in India’s defence engagements with the US is a testimony to India putting its national security over balanced multilateral commitments.
Further as a major power in the Indian Ocean Region, India has diversified its relations with the Middle East, particularly the Gulf countries, and African countries. The recent plurilateral initiatives involving the Middle Eastern countries – the I2U2 (India, Israel, the US and the UAE) and India, Saudi Arabia, the US and the UAE – are aimed at boosting connectivity between Middle East and South Asia and countering China’s BRI.
Multilateral engagements are important for India. However, with China’s overbearing presence in the groupings such as the SCO and the BRICS, India is likely to strengthen its engagements with the forums and mechanisms countering China. India stands to gain little from the current state of the SCO and BRICS as these represent two sides of the same coin for India.
[Photo by Prime Minister’s Office, India]
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
The author is a Political Analyst and Researcher based in Vadodara, India.
