The list of so-called lone wolf terrorist attacks in both the West is long and has always been long. However, recent years have seen an increase in the number and intensity of these types of attacks. From France and Great Britain to Finland, Sweden and the US, attacks by single individuals have become more frequent over the past years. Despite the observed rise in frequency and importance of these attacks, there is much disagreement among academics and practitioners concerning the conceptualization, evaluation and potential counter-measures to lone wolf terrorism. Who is considered a lone wolf and how lonely are these individuals really? Are we currently witnessing the rise of a new and successful type of terrorist strategy or should we judge these attacks as the result of failure to plan and execute bigger, more complicated and potentially more lethal types of attacks?
How alone is the loner?
There is much disagreement as to who should be considered a lone actor. Some include small groups such as the couple that perpetrated the Bernardino attack under the umbrella term, others state that it can only be a single individual receiving no outside help, while others include those who did receive outside help at some point but perpetrated the attack alone. Most, however, believe that a lone actor is not officially part of a terrorist organization, has not received direct orders for the attack and has executed it alone. While many of the recent attacks have been attributed to followers of the so-called Islamic State, the phenomenon is not limited to a single extremist ideology. The attacker in Nice is considered a lone wolf just as much as the Norwegian right-wing extremist Anders Breivik or Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh.
The question is how ‘lonely’ these lone wolves actually are. Most single-actor perpetrators do not reinvent the wheel but adhere to an existing ideology or even affiliate themselves with a specific existing organization. They are usually part of a larger conglomerate of extremists within the same ideological framework, but they may not have contact with others within that conglomerate and not receive help for their attack. This also means that the label ‘lone wolf’ is an externally imposed description. Most single actors will not consider themselves lone wolves, but part of a larger movement or, in the case of Islamist perpetrators, part of the ummah. Contrary to what external onlookers may see, these individuals view themselves as selfless soldiers acting on behalf of their community.
Lone wolf attacks are often part of a deliberate strategy of today’s terrorist organizations, including right-wing leaderless resistance as much as Islamist leaderless jihad. Especially ISIS has repeatedly called upon its followers to take up a weapon of their choice and perpetrate an attack where they are based rather than making the journey to the so-called Islamic State. Single-actor terrorism is a deliberate strategy for ISIS to spread terroristic violence to Western countries and the group has put forward manuals with suggestions of types of attacks and targets, including how to turn a vehicle into a weapon. Consequently, lone wolves do not only view themselves as part of a larger entity but are sometimes also viewed as part of the same entity by other members of that group. Single actor terrorism mainly exists in the conceptualizations and analyses of Western academics and practitioners, not in the minds of terrorists themselves.
However, even if one seeks to employ objective standards of lone action rather than considering the mindset of the perpetrators, one will find that we are far away from having clear-cut criteria for lone wolf terrorism. In the age of global connectivity, how lonely can a lone wolf be? In a time when extremist and terrorist groups are increasingly existing as social, and virtual networks, it is increasingly difficult to judge membership and affiliation to a group. How many clicks, likes or comments does it take for an individual to be considered part of the organization and not a lone wolf? Not only is radicalization increasingly driven by online interactions and active propaganda dissemination in the virtual sphere, terrorists have also started to use WhatsApp and other instant messaging applications to directly communicate with individuals rather than groups of followers. Is someone, who receives direct orders via an app from a person he or she has never met and who is located 2500km away a lone wolf? The reality of terrorism is evolving faster than our conceptualizations of the types of attacks. We need a broader discussion of the issue of lone wolf terrorism not only for conceptual clarity, but to find potential counter-measures, which fit the reality of the threat.
How successful is single-actor terrorism?
How successful are single-actor attacks? The answer to this question very much depends on how one evaluates success for a terrorist attack. A 2016 RUSI report showed that these types of attacks are generally not extremely effective in terms of casualties with an average of 1.22 fatalities per attack and 76% of attacks not resulting in loss of life. However, this report utilizes data until 2014 and the most lethal lone wolf attacks, including Nice and Manchester, have occurred after 2014. A report utilizing newer data would likely find an increase in lethality of lone actors due to the recent events. However, compared to 9/11 or the Madrid train bombings, even those attacks are less successful in terms of the actual number of fatalities.
But how wise is it to judge the success of attacks solely based on their lethality? The goal of terroristic violence is not only to kill and injure as many people as possible; in fact, a defining characteristic of terrorism is that it is an attack on society as a whole beyond the immediate victims. We, therefore, need to ask how successful lone wolf terrorism has been in installing fear in the population and making an impact beyond the casualties of these attacks. In this respect, the recent single-actor attacks have been very successful. The message is clearer than ever: You can experience terrorism anywhere at any time without any warning. Simply going to work, spending the evening on a Christmas market or enjoying a walk on a bridge now carries the memory of a terrorist attack. It is no longer only the crowded places, which are targeted, but anything can become a target. This causes fear and discomfort in the population in their daily lives and changes not only the political and social but also the urban landscape with the introduction of barriers to protect pedestrians from vehicle attacks.
Lone actors have been very successful in bringing the terror even closer to the doorstep of the Western electorate. Although it is debatable how lonely these actors really are, it is evident that single actor attacks are part of a larger strategy employed by groups such as ISIS. This also means that the recent rise in attacks and the following political and social changes must be evaluated as a success from the point of view of the militant group, regardless of the number of fatalities a single attack caused.
In the age of connectivity, we may need to re-evaluate our understanding of what lone wolf terrorism entails and how we can conceptualize it effectively. Conceptual clarity and an understanding of the nuances, as well as limitations of this concept, will benefit academics, practitioners and politicians to gain a holistic understanding of the issue. Single actors have successfully perpetrated numerous attacks, which may not have killed large amounts of people but have installed fear and brought real changes to the political and physical landscapes. The phenomenon is likely to continue in the coming years and everyone would benefit from an open discussion on the terminology, definitions and evaluations of this issue.
Linda Schlegel is a PhD student at Goethe University Frankfurt and an Associate Fellow at both the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) and modus I Center for Applied Research on Deradicalization. Her research focuses on storytelling in P/CVE narrative campaigns, gaming and extremism, and digital radicalization processes.
