Iran and Armenia have signed a secret military deal worth 500 million USD, according to an Iran International News report authored by journalist Negar Mojtahedi. The report claims that Iran will supply weapons to Armenia including its well-known suicide drones Shahed 136, Shahed 129, Shahed 197, Mohajer, and air defence missile systems the 3rd Khordad, Majid, 15th Khordad, and Arman. The report also claims that the Armenia-Iran deal will include intelligence sharing, training and close military cooperation. After the publication of the report Armenia’s Ministry of Defence described the information as ‘fictitious and false’, but gave no further comment.
Armenia has been rearming following defeat in the Second Karabakh War and has accelerated the process recently, continuing to acquire French and Indian weapons. Armenia has become the largest importer of Indian-manufactured weapons with the total volume of arms purchases reaching 600 million USD by the start of the current financial year 2024-25, according to India’s Finance Ministry. In February the French defence minister paid a visit to Armenia and signed defence deals. Details of the deals were not made public, though it is no longer a secret that France is supplying Armenia with offensive weapons as part of the destructive role of President Macron in the South Caucasus region. In June, Armenia and France made a deal to provide Yerevan with French Caesar self-propelled howitzers.
As the country that launched a war of aggression against neighbouring Azerbaijan and occupied Azerbaijani land for 26 years, Armenia’s rapid rearmament policy has a negative impact on the ongoing peace process and allows external disruptive actors such as France, India and Iran to stir up regional insecurity. On 22nd July French President Macron began his move to facilitate Armenia’s access to the European Union’s Peace Fund so that Armenia can rebuild its armed forces. As part of this process the European Union has provided a 10 million Euro package to Armenia, a unique decision considering that Armenia is an official Russian ally and CSTO member. Despite the fact that Russia controls Armenia’s borders and economy and that Yerevan acts as a hub for sanctions evasion and re-export, the European Union under French command decided to arm Armenia. By not trying to shut down the Armenian channel for sanctions evasion and re-export, France and to a certain degree the United States seem to have a common understanding with Russia regarding Armenia in order to boost Armenia’s military capabilities in the region. Ironically, Armenia’s verbal altercation with Russia sells in the West as it portrays Armenia as a supposedly pro-Western and anti-Russia state despite the doubling of trade turnover between Yerevan and Moscow.
All this and Iran’s tolerance of the French, EU and US activities in Armenia indicate that there is a common understanding between the various geopolitical centres, as was the case during the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani lands. This understanding took the form of the OSCE Minsk Group and Iran’s use of Armenia as a geopolitical proxy, boosting its capabilities in order to counter Azerbaijan and Turkey.
In June the London-based Middle East Eye reported that Turkish authorities suspect Iran of arming the PKK terrorist organisation with loitering surface-to-air missiles, which the PKK used to shoot at Turkish armed drones hunting terrorists in Iraq. In an interview to a local Turkish TV channel in May, Turkish Defence Minister Yaşar Güler accused Iran of hindering counterterrorism measures against the PKK fighters who cross the border into Iran, as Tehran refuses to act after being provided with the exact location of the PKK fighters inside Iran. Previously, then Turkish Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu accused Iran of harbouring PKK fighters in the north-western city of Make and called on Tehran to put an end to the PKK presence inside Iran. In response, Tehran denied the presence of PKK troops. As part of its broad strategy, Tehran uses the PKK factor to contain Turkish influence in Iraq and Syria. The Iran International report about a secret Armenia-Iran deal follows the pattern of the reports about possible Iranian arms supplies to PKK fighters, as the Islamic Republic leadership views peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and normalisation between Armenia and Turkey as an existential threat to its interests and a huge geopolitical win for Azerbaijan and Turkey.
IRAN-ARMENIA MILITARY COOPERATION SINCE 2020
Security ties and regional cooperation between Iran and Armenia have intensified since the liberation of Azerbaijani lands in 2020 and the emergence of the new regional realities. Iran opened a consulate in southern Armenia in October 2022 as part of the “special relations” between the two sides noted by Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan at the official opening. In August 2022, Iran hosted a drone tournament involving Armenia, Belarus and Russia where tests of drones’ reconnaissance and artillery guiding abilities were carried out. Iran’s role as a logistical supply corridor for Indian weapons going into Armenia is well known. At that time it was also claimed that Iran had given Armenia 500 Dehlavieh antitank guided missiles and 100 Almas missiles.
Iran’s ambassador to Armenia Mehdi Sobhani, who was appointed in 2023, was formerly ambassador to Syria. According to the Israeli ALMA research and education centre, the post of Iranian ambassador to Syria is usually held by a senior IRGC officer in charge of coordinating Iranian activity with the Assad regime rather than a diplomat appointed by Iran’s Foreign Ministry. This illustrates the high regard of Iran’s IRGC for Armenia. The report also claimed that Iran uses Armenia as an air corridor to supply its proxy groups in Syria and Lebanon. Another report that 17,000 assault rifles were “lost” and missing in Armenia led to research that claimed that Armenia serves as a weapons smuggling hub for Iran and its Middle Eastern proxies. From a US intelligence cable published by Wikileaks, it is known that in 2008 US diplomats concluded that Armenia had supplied Iran with rockets and machine guns which were used by Iranian proxies in Iraq against US forces.
Mehdi Sobhani’s interviews and statements after arriving in Yerevan follow Tehran’s regional policies where normalisation and peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Armenia and Turkey are perceived as an undesirable geopolitical outcome. The Iranian ambassador aims to inflame Armenian revanchist circles in order to hinder the peace process alongside his French counterpart Olivier Decottignies. A meeting between Mehdi Sobhani and French ambassador Decottignies in which they discussed regional developments is also worthy of attention, as France and Iran clearly share the goals of boosting Armenia as an outpost to hinder the peace process and counter Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Armenian Defence Minister Suren Papikyan frequently visits Paris and Tehran. During an official visit to the Iranian capital in March he met top Iranian military officials such as Major General Mohammad Bagheri, the Chief of General Staff of the Iranian armed forces, and Defence Minister Brigadier General Mohammad-Reza Gharaei Ashtiani and discussed with them the deepening of bilateral military cooperation and security ties, reaching agreements on issues of mutual concern. On 9th July this year the Armenian defence minister received Iranian Ambassador Sobhani and the new Iranian defence attaché, Mohammad Najafi, and discussed defence cooperation with them.
COERCIVE IRANIAN WARFARE AGAINST AZERBAIJAN
Iran’s coercive policy in the region is based on a multidimensional calculated strategy which is a mixture of hybrid tactics, including military threats, terror attacks and the use of proxy elements. Through diplomacy Tehran attempts to de-escalate and keep the circle of escalation under control. During the Second Karabakh War, as the Azerbaijani army was rapidly advancing along the Araz river in the Araz valley campaign, Iranian troops briefly crossed the international border between the two countries and delayed the Azerbaijani army’s advance for a couple of days. The aim was to stop the advance of the Azerbaijani army and provide the retreating Armenian armed forces with an opportunity to regroup and counterattack.
In addition, Iranian officials, including the state media and IRGC officers, in coordination with Armenian, Russian and French media and official propaganda, kept spreading baseless rumours and unsubstantiated allegations that so-called Syrian fighters were participating in Azerbaijan’s military operations.
Iran’s illegal fuel supply to the Armenian separatists continued after 2020, and illustrating that Tehran wanted to strengthen the Armenian irredentist entity in order to have geopolitical leverage against Azerbaijan. Moreover, Iran sent a group of Iranian nationals to the Karabakh region in 2022 via Armenia and then the Lachin road, which at that time was controlled by Russian peacekeepers. Azerbaijani media published the identities of the 14 Iranian nationals who were suspected of being saboteurs planning to train the illegal Armenian armed groups in Karabakh. As a result of this security threat, Iranian involvement, and other illegal activities of Armenian armed groups under Russian supervision, Azerbaijan demanded action and control over the border in Lachin.
Iran’s collaboration with Armenia and Russia aimed to keep the post-2020 status quo intact and bolster the Armenian armed formations in Karabakh. In addition, Iranian media continued publishing conspiracy theories and accusing Azerbaijan, Turkey, Israel and the US of collaboration in a plot against Tehran and Moscow’s interests in the region. Now that Azerbaijan has taken back control of its territory, including the Lachin corridor, and Russian peacekeepers have left Karabakh, the Islamic Republic is seeking to prevent the signing of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Turkey. Tehran’s military support for Armenia pursues this policy.
[Image credit: P. S. Burton, via Wikimedia Commons]
Rufat Ahmadzada is a graduate of City, University of London. His research area covers the South Caucasus and Iran. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect TGP’s editorial stance.
