In mid-August, China fired warning shots across its border with Myanmar in an overt display of its duplicity in Myanmar’s ongoing civil war. Rather than coming to the assistance of the junta, this move sought to send a message to the military regime, deterring it from continuing an offensive against the rebel headquarters of the Kachin Independence Army in Lai Zar. This, however, should not come as a surprise and is instead the latest example of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) playing both sides in this conflict.
Sharing a 1,250-mile-long border with its southern neighbor, China’s utmost strategic priority in Myanmar is maintaining its own security and stability. If the military junta cannot guarantee this, then the CCP have demonstrated a willingness to switch allegiances to an insurgency that may well be gaining the upper hand. The effects of this, however, could be disastrous for Myanmar, prolonging the conflict and leading to a potential fracturing of the country.
Alongside warning shots, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has increased its presence along this shared frontier, with more ground patrols and aerial surveillance. This comes after reports of artillery shells spilling over from Myanmar into the neighboring Chinese province of Yunnan, disrupting the main route for the flow of goods and people between the two countries. Beijing has since been vocal in its concerns over the damage caused, with its patience seemingly wearing thin with the military regime in Naypyidaw. This is unsurprising considering the limited successes of multiple China-mediated ceasefires in the north of the country.
China’s frustration with the military regime that ousted former leader Aung San Suu Kyi in February 2021 has been evident from the start of the conflict. Since then, China has hedged its bets, providing support in the form of military hardware to both sides. In response to the military’s inability to deal with cross border criminal activity, China lent its support to ‘Operation 1027’ in October 2023. The offensive, launched by the Three Brotherhood Alliance of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Ta’ang National Liberation Army in the northern state of Shan, broke the deadlock in favor of the resistance groups, demonstrating unprecedented unity and dealing a near fatal blow to the military’s morale.
Yet just last month Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was in Myanmar, holding talks with key junta officials. Meeting with General Min Aung Hlaing, Wang thanked the Chairman of the State Administrative Council for his support of China in international forums, despite knowing that such diplomatic assistance was not being reciprocated by military support from Beijing. Following discussions, the Chinese government spoke positively of ‘joint efforts to crack down on cross-border crimes, and to create a safe environment for bilateral exchanges and cooperation.’ Should the military still emerge victorious from this protracted conflict, China is ensuring that its ties to the regime are not completely severed.
The reality, however, is bleak, both for the military and for the unity of Myanmar as a whole. Tacit and overt support from China for the junta and the various rebel groups fighting against it will deny both sides a comprehensive victory, threatening instead to create a situation reminiscent to Syria post-Arab Spring, with different factions controlling portions of the country. At the start of August, Myanmar’s military acknowledged the loss of a compound in the town of Lashio in the northeast of the country. Now under the control of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the base was the headquarters of the military’s Northeastern Command and is the first regional command center to fall into the hands of rebel militias. With Lashio sitting just 70 miles south of the Chinese border, this development could have provided Beijing with a security challenge, had its covert support for the rebels not prepared for such eventualities.
Whether Myanmar comes out of this conflict whole or fragmented, China is attempting to ensure that its economic and strategic interests in the country remain protected. Myanmar offers China access to the Indian Ocean through a deep-water port in the westernmost state of Rakhine. Even amidst the chaos of the civil war, China has continued to pressure the junta to ensure the port’s completion, alongside the creation of a special economic zone. Yet elsewhere, rebel groups have also offered to protect Chinese economic interests after capturing a Beijing-backed nickel mine in Mandalay. Such guarantees are conflicting and allow China to benefit from a fragmented country.
Yet, Beijing must still be cautious. Offering support for rebel groups rarely pays off in the long run for great powers. Although with China’s recent track record of supporting militants in Northeast India, notably the splinter faction of the United Liberation Front of Asom, this strategy is unlikely to change any time soon.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
Marcus Andreopoulos is a Senior Research Fellow at the international policy assessment group, the Asia-Pacific Foundation, and a Subject Matter Expert with the Global Threats Advisory Group at NATO’s Defence Education Enhancement Programme. Marcus is currently pursuing a PhD in international history at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).
