U.S. President Donald Trump’s America First policy, which has challenged the rules-based international order, has sent shockwaves around the world. This geopolitical earthquake has been so profound that renowned American scholars are warning about the end of the long American century. But one power’s end could mark the rise of another. China, for instance, has been repeatedly branded as the Trump-led U.S.’ main rival – and with good reason. China has achieved remarkable economic growth: it is the world’s largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) and the second-largest in terms of gross domestic product (GDP). It plays a central role in global economic cooperation and globalization in general, positioning itself as an economic e-superpower.
This is the reason why I was invited to the 2023 Euro-Asia Economic Forum in Xi’an, organized by the Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (IWEP-CASS) as one of the keynote speakers – I delivered a speech about enduring and mutually beneficial China-Kazakhstan economic relations. Increasingly, however, China seems to aspire to another form of dominance – this time as an educational e-superpower. Rooted in longstanding traditions of valuing education – what might be called an Education First policy – China regards itself as a center of knowledge, learning, and Confucianism. In January 2025, China announced its audacious plan to become an educational power by 2035: Education Power Construction Plan Outline (2024-2035).
Four months later in May 2025, Chinese state media Xinhua News Agency approached me for an interview on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), KIMEP University, and related topics. China has invested around $1.2 trillion in the BRI since 2013, focusing on two main components: the Silk Road Economic Belt, and the 21st Maritime Silk Road. The interview is scheduled for June 8, but I would like to share some preliminary thoughts with readers.
The BRI and Kazakhstan
President Xi Jinping first announced the BRI in Kazakhstan in September 2013, making Kazakhstan the initiative’s symbolic starting point. Since then, China has signed more than 200 cooperation documents with more than 150 countries. It is no surprise that Kazakhstan has become a major recipient of BRI investment. As of 2024, the China-Central Asia trade volume reached $95 billion, with China-Kazakh trade accounting for about 46% of the total. According to the World Bank report in 2020, the BRI could have a large effect on Kazakhstan’s GDP. The impact of improved infrastructure was estimated at around 6.5%, while improved trade facilitation and reduced tariffs would add around 15%. This has allowed Kazakhstan to promote regional integration actively and consolidate its position as a leading country in Central Asia.
Importantly, KIMEP faculty published a 2023 study marking the BRI’s 10th anniversary, examining Kazakh perceptions of China. The findings echoed a 2017 survey by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which showed about 65% of Kazakhs saw China as a clear or potential threat. A 2020 Central Asia Barometer survey revealed that over 70% of Kazakhs were very or somewhat concerned about China’s influence. These results underscore the gap between China’s economic outreach and its soft power appeal.
In short, my assessment is that, indeed, China’s BRI has contributed to Kazakhstan’s economic development and regional integration, but this should not be the end of the story. To maximize the impact of the BRI on Kazakhstan, China needs to consider how to enhance its image. Earning hearts and minds cannot be simply done with economic and military power.
The BRI and KIMEP
As noted, China aspires to expand its educational cooperation. KIMEP University has greatly benefited from BRI-related engagement. Prior to the initiative, we had partnerships with just 4 or 5 Chinese universities. Today, we are collaborating with over 30 of them. For instance, we signed an agreement with the City University of Macau, which now offers free accommodation to KIMEP students. One student recently received a grant to attend a summer school at East China Normal University in Shanghai.
This semester, we hosted delegations from the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and the Education University of Hong Kong. Beijing Open University is planning a visit to discuss a potential memorandum of full understanding in the fall.
The BRI has also increased the number of Chinese students and scholars at KIMEP. Before the initiative, less than 10 Chinese students were enrolled, and only a few exchange students or scholars visited. Now, over 50 Chinese students study here each semester, and more than 20 exchange students or visiting scholars have joined us. Notably, this spring, we welcomed a visiting scholar from Peking University, coordinated by our China Affairs Office – the first and only such office in Kazakhstan, established shortly after the BRI’s launch in early 2014. To meet growing demand, we have allocated new office space for visiting scholars, set to open in September 2025.
In 2018, KIMEP and Beijing Normal University’s Belt and Road Research Institute established the China-Kazakhstan Belt and Road Joint Research Center. We have also built strong ties with the Chinese Consulate in Almaty, hosting lectures and meetings on campus.
However, as previously stated, China’s positive role has not translated into positive perceptions: it has failed to translate hard power into soft power.
Educational and cultural exchanges
Despite these perceptions, the outlook for educational and cultural exchanges remains positive. KIMEP University has strong ties with China, and I believe that we are among the country’s leading institutions in this area. I personally hold honorary positions from Beijing Normal University and Capital University of Economics and Business. On behalf of KIMEP, I awarded an honorary doctorate to the distinguished historian Professor Shen Zhihua, and have spoken several times at the Tsinghua Area Studies Forum. Additionally, the DPRK Strategic Research Center at KIMEP has been invited to a symposium organized by the Huayu Think Tank in Beijing later this month.
Our China & Central Asia Studies Center, founded in 2017, is the only unit of its kind globally. We also offer Chinese language courses through the College of Human Sciences and Education. Notably, KIMEP now has around 30 partner universities in China, including Peking University (with which we signed an agreement in 2009, before the onset of the BRI). In 2022, KIMEP University also established viable cooperation with Tsinghua University, China’s top university, from which President Xi Jinping graduated. A Tsinghua branch office, the KIMEP-Institute for International and Area Studies (IIAS) Fieldwork Station, was established at KIMEP in 2023 and has welcomed several scholars over the years, most notably Professor Shen Zhihua, who, alongside his distinguished colleagues, Dr. Zheng Nan and Dr. Shi Jing from the IIAS, inaugurated the center that same year.
Beyond KIMEP, academic engagement is expanding. In August 2023, a delegation from the Institute of Microbiology at the Chinese Academy of Sciences visited Nazarbayev University School of Medicine. That same year, China’s leading technical institution, the Northwestern Polytechnical University in Xi’an, opened a branch at Al-Farabi Kazakh National University. These developments stem from deepening Kazakhstan-China relations.
In terms of cultural exchanges, Kazakhstan and China have a centuries-long history. The Great Silk Road passed through these territories, and its regional main route went across Semirechye and South Kazakhstan. In recent years, symbolic initiatives have underscored this legacy: 2024 was declared the Year of Kazakhstan Tourism in China, and 2025 the Year of China Tourism in Kazakhstan. President Xi Jinping’s 2024 visit to Kazakhstan led to the Kazakhstan-China Forum, where Minister of Culture and Information, Aida Balayeva emphasized the importance of cultural cooperation, including creative teams, museum exhibitions, films screenings, and cultural centers.
The Central Asia-China Media Forum began in Astana on May 29, and on June 1, the first tourist train from Xi’an arrived in Almaty. These are encouraging signs for future exchanges.
Academic collaboration and regional challenge
Academic dialogue between Kazakh and Chinese institutions is growing, but regional collaboration across Central Asia remains limited.
One encouraging development was the 2024 Kazakhstan-China Think Tank Forum, launched in Beijing by the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies (KazISS) and the Institute of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Topics included the impact of global challenges on Kazakhstan-China relations, and the role of higher education in strengthening both economies. The second forum is scheduled to take place in Kazakhstan next year. I believe this joint effort could serve as a valuable platform for addressing regional challenges throughout Central Asia.
As an educator, I take graduate employment very seriously. KIMEP is exceptional in the sense that more than 95% of students find a job within several months after graduation. But other universities seem to struggle. This is likely why this year has been declared the Year of Working Professions in Kazakhstan. Internships for students and teachers have been organized at partner institutions in China, where they gain hands-on experience with advanced technologies and modern production standards. Tackling relatively new issues, such as artificial intelligence (AI) and digitalization of education, is another challenge. Central Asian and Chinese academic institutions need to work on these challenges together. That way, academic institutions can play a leading role in addressing regional challenges and laying out a vision for the future.
China and Central Asia
China now has a strategic opening in Central Asia. Historically dominated by Russia, the region’s balance of power is shifting. Since the BRI’s launch, China has become Central Asia’s largest trading partner. With Russia preoccupied with its war in Ukraine, and the U.S., under President Trump, retrenching globally, China now has a golden opportunity to consolidate its position in the region.
China is also becoming more active on security issues. Between 2010-2014, Chinese military exports accounted for just 1.5% of Central Asia’s total arms imports. By 2019, that figure had increased to 18%. In 2021, Tajikistan approved the construction of a new base following an agreement between its Interior Ministry and China’s Ministry of Public Security. This kind of engagement enhances China’s security footprint near Afghanistan – a region of strategic concern due to the potential instability affecting the Xinjiang area. Russia’s war in Ukraine has intensified security concerns in Central Asia. It is no coincidence that China launched the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in April 2022, shortly after Russia’s invasion. The GSI emphasizes sovereignty, noninterference, and counterterrorism.
That being said, China needs to make every effort to promote its own development at home. It seems to me there are signs of economic stagnation in China. As an economist, I would say that this is related to the country’s export-oriented economy. This system can generate rapid growth up until a certain point. To achieve sustained development, however, a consumption-oriented economy is needed. China is almost dumping its precious products. These products need to be consumed by the domestic population, which would lead to dynamic economic activity and sustained prosperity within the country.
Lastly, again, China needs to reflect more deeply on why its active engagement has not translated into its soft power. It is great that China has invested a lot of money in the region, but it needs to address its negative image if it wants to play a constructive role.
The second Central Asia-China Summit
In a word, I expect the second Central Asia-China summit to be positive. The groundwork has already been laid. On April 26, the sixth Foreign Ministers’ Meeting between Central Asia and China took place in Almaty. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi proposed several measures for deepening Central Asia-China cooperation. Kazakh Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Murat Nurtleu, along with other Central Asian counterparts, agreed with the proposals and stated that both sides are ready to strengthen the synergy between their national strategies and the BRI.
Furthermore, in Beijing on May 24, Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Bin and Kazakh Deputy Foreign Minister Alibek Bakayev co-chaired the Vice Foreign Minister-Level Consultation on the second Central Asia-China Summit. All parties discussed preparations for the upcoming summit, cooperation in key areas, and the building of the China-Central Asia mechanism. This is why I am confident the summit will yield a positive outcome.
I think there are several strategic areas where China could make tangible contributions to the region. It would be great if the following issues could be discussed at the summit, or on another platform later: AI, renewable energy (including solar energy), global education, and health, among others. Make no mistake, China has challenges as well – an aging population, effective use of its investment, real estate issues, and so on. Forging favorable conditions to address these challenges would enhance both China’s hard and soft power.
Lastly, China would need to realize that success in Central Asia could lead to further progress in other regions. For example, it could help China find a viable solution to the issue of Korea. Maintaining peace and prosperity in Central Asia could generate useful insights on how to solve such a challenging issue in Northeast Asia.
I wish Central Asia and China every success in the summit.
[Photo by Lommes, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons]
Dr. Chan Young Bang is the founder and President of KIMEP University, Principal Investigator at the DPRK Strategic Research Center, and a former economic adviser to Nursultan Nazarbayev, the first President of Kazakhstan. His current research focuses on nuclear non-proliferation and the economic development of the DPRK (North Korea). He is the author of more than 70 articles and nine books on the global prospects for achieving peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula. His latest English-language books include Transition Beyond Denuclearization: A Bold Challenge for Kim Jong Un and A Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons: Perspectives on Socioeconomic Development which were published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2020 and 2023, respectively.
Dr Sungju Park-Kang is Research Fellow at the DPRK Strategic Research Center and Assistant Professor of International Relations at KIMEP University. Park-Kang is also Adjunct Professor at the Centre for East Asian Studies, University of Turku, Finland. He was formerly Assistant Professor of Korean Studies and International Relations at Leiden University, the Netherlands and the University of Central Lancashire, UK. His work has appeared in Review of International Studies, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Asia Europe Journal, Polity and The Geopolitics, among others. Park-Kang is the author of Tears of Theory: International Relations as Storytelling and Fictional International Relations: Gender, Pain and Truth. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors.
