While the world is occupied with the conflict in Ukraine, another serious threat looms large in the horizon with a potential to have even more serious security implications. China, another great power with aggressive claims over almost the entire of South China Sea, is watching this conflict in Europe with immense interest as it unfolds. The preoccupation of the US and its allies with the crisis in Ukraine might offer a golden opportunity to the Chinese to militarily expand across the disputed territories in the South China Sea which would have serious repercussions for the security and stability of the established world order.
Russia’s assault against Ukraine began after a series of failed attempts by the West to take Putin into confidence with respect to written security assurances from the NATO. The genesis of the current Ukrainian crisis can be traced to the steady eastward expansion of NATO into a territory that has always been considered by the Russian security experts as its achilles heel as its flatlands offer the most suitable route for foreign invaders into their country. Thus, Eastern Europe is and has always been a strategic region for the Russians and even more so after the dissolution of USSR. The fall of Soviet Union has left the area outside Russian control and in the hands of regimes which are more tilted towards the West. The present crisis can well be seen as a culmination of Russia’s resolute intent to strengthen its national security vis-à-vis policies adopted by the West in Eastern Europe.
China is watching this crisis with a keen interest and might even be tempted to exploit it to suit its own expansionist agendas. The USA is a common variable in both the situations but it has not yet committed itself to boots on the ground to fight the Russians in Ukraine. If it does, the pre-occupation of its policymakers with the war in Eastern Europe will shift its immediate national priorities away from the key Indo-Pacific region where an even bigger challenge lies in the form of an aggressive China. There are concerns that Taiwan might become the Ukraine of tomorrow if China decides to take advantage of the world’s pre-occupation with the crisis in Eastern Europe. This happened during 1962 when the Chinese forces attacked Indian forward posts along the Himalayas while the world was engrossed with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Although, China continued to attack the Indian forces for almost a month even after the Cuban Missile Crisis subsided, it cannot be overlooked that the Chinese did start the offensive at a time when the world was pre-occupied with a nuclear confrontation in North America.
Moreover, China and Russia share certain commonalities in their strategic outlook and in their pursuit of national interests. Both Xi Jinping’s China and Putin’s Russia are revisionist in nature and claim territories of other countries in the neighborhood in their respective missions to revive their nation’s old glory. President Putin always saw Ukraine as part of a Greater Russia, but he has always been ambivalent about the complete takeover of the country. President Xi Jinping, on the other hand, has vowed to achieve reunification with Taiwan through a complete takeover on many occasions in the past and as such there is a high likelihood of it being planned.
Similarly, both Russia and China resent the military presence of the United States and its allies in their immediate neighborhood particularly the existence of pro-West governments on territories considered by them as strategically important for their national security. Also, if the current crisis in Ukraine is short and Russia agrees to a peace with the West after achieving its strategic objectives, China might like to exploit this short window of opportunity to forcefully seize Taiwan while the US and its allies are focused on Ukraine. If the crisis in Ukraine lasts longer, it will shift the policy focus as well as the key resources of US away from the Indo-Pacific which will be even better for China as it will offer them the time for undertaking military preparations as well as building a strategy for achieving the eventual reunification with Taiwan.
Another reason that might tempt Xi Jinping to be ambitious in his approach towards Taiwan is related to cementing his position as ‘President for life’. Even though the Communist parliament in 2018 abolished the term limit restriction on Xi Jinping, it doesn’t necessarily translate into him being the de-facto leader of China. There are many variables that needs to be taken into consideration before coming to any such conclusion. There has been growing dissent against Xi Jinping’s unrestricted powers within China as is evident from his efforts to clamp down on criticisms such as through the 2018 cyberspace laws regulating self-media accounts or through measures aimed at imposing party discipline on people and his loyalist Chen Yixin’s efforts to enforce discipline on personnel of the security apparatus.
Moreover, Xi Jinping’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic has raised apprehensions regarding his administrative capabilities as well as tarnished his image as a powerful world leader. The crisis in Ukraine, therefore, offers a short window of opportunity for him to regain his image as a strong leader and the quickest way to achieve this goal is to forcefully seize control of Taiwan lying just around a hundred miles away from its coast.
Taiwan is geopolitically important for China and forms the key in neutralizing the effects of strategic encirclement by the US through its “Island Chain Strategy” which limits China’s military force projection in the Western Pacific and therefore its efforts to develop as a maritime power. An important factor that might tempt the Chinese to annex Taiwan is related to its population geography. Most of its population is concentrated on the northern and southern ends of the island around Taipei and Kaohsiung regions. All its major metropolises including its capital Taipei is situated to the west of the Central Mountain Range facing China making it logistically convenient for any Chinese military advance from the east to easily swoop through its heartland leading to its quick capitulation before any major Western intervention. But the same geography also offers Taiwan a strategic buffer against any possible Chinese offensive.
Unlike Ukraine, that shares more than a thousand miles of land border with Russia, Taiwan doesn’t share any contiguous land border with China as it is an island separated from the Chinese mainland by approximately hundred miles of waterbody. As a result, any Chinese military offensive against Taiwan will likely be a large-scale and complex amphibious assault which will be noticed well in advance thereby losing its element of surprise key to any successful military operation.
Also, the US has three military bases all along the western margins of Taiwan facing China in addition to other military bases in the Western Pacific as a part of its “Island Chain Strategy” of which Taiwan forms an integral part. Since, the US is not yet militarily involved in the Ukrainian crisis, any Chinese aggression against Taiwan will activate the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty thereby leading to a quick military response in the defense of Taiwan. The US didn’t have any such military commitment towards Ukraine and thus when the Russian invasion began, it could get away with not getting itself militarily involved into the conflict. Moreover, Taiwan is much more important to the US economy than Ukraine as it is its ninth largest trading partner. In addition to playing an important role in the global electronics and semiconductor supply chain, Taiwanese semiconductors also feed the US defense industry due to their role in the manufacturing of advanced weapons systems such as ballistic missile defense systems and advanced fighter jets. Also, a large number of American technology companies outside the defense sector are dependent on the supply of semiconductor chips from Taiwan. Therefore, any increased disruption to the semiconductor supply chain of Taiwan can have ripple effects throughout the US economy in addition to jeopardizing the production of its critical military equipment. In this context, a quick US military intervention against a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan cannot be ruled out which is why the Chinese leadership will not be very keen on opening a theatre of conflict in its neighborhood unless it is absolutely sure that the US will not be able to provide its full military support in the defense of Taiwan.
This can only happen if the US gets militarily involved into the Ukraine crisis which will divert its military resources away from Indo-Pacific. By coming to the aid of Taiwan, the US will also send a strong signal to the world that the alliance systems created by it throughout the globe is still intact as questions have already been raised regarding their futility after Russia’s action against Ukraine, America’s close partner in Eastern Europe. To Washington, Indo-Pacific is geopolitically more important than Eastern Europe and thus, any such conflict in this region will likely trigger an immediate response in the defense of its allies. Furthermore, China, which aspires to be the next superpower, wouldn’t want to exploit the crisis in Ukraine to annex a territory it claims as its own. If it does, it will be branded as an opportunist power that will dent its aspirations of being a norm setter of international politics which is key if it wants to establish an alternative world order. Seen in this context, it seems unlikely that China will try to launch any military action against Taiwan due to the high costs involved, both diplomatic and military, as compared to the returns of such an endeavor.
Therefore, the question stands: Will China launch an invasion of Taiwan while the United States is pre-occupied with the Ukrainian crisis? If it does, then the involvement of US military is highly likely due to Taiwan’s strategic significance to American interests. The high costs of engaging a superior American military through a complex amphibious assault as well as the heavy diplomatic costs involved of being seen as an aggressor might force Xi Jinping to rein in any such expansionist agendas. Also, the economic repercussions of a war at a time when the Chinese economy is going through a slowdown might pressurize its leadership to forgo any ambitions of annexing Taiwan. But history teaches us that countries have been known to take actions that defied all logic. For instance, Hitler’s invasion of the mighty Soviet Union during the Second World War was a decision that shocked the world as it went against the expected notions of that time. Hence, it is difficult to make predictions with certainty regarding such policies of a nation as a multitude of variables influence those decisions.
Chinese expansionism in the Indo-Pacific has been checked due to the presence of a strong American military in the region. If that stabilizing factor is no longer existing or is weakened, then the Chinese military advance will only be logical. So, if the Americans get themselves militarily entangled in the Ukrainian crisis for a longer duration, the Chinese might be tempted to militarily prepare for a swift invasion of Taiwan by exploiting the gaps in American military readiness in the Indo-Pacific due to their pre-occupation with Ukraine. However, if the Americans make peace with Russians in the short term before committing its forces in the defense of Ukraine, then the likelihood of a Chinese assault against Taiwan is less. Alternatively, if the Americans doesn’t commit its forces to Eastern Europe even in the event of a protracted conflict in Ukraine, the Chinese will still be reluctant to send its military to Taiwan to avoid the risks of engaging with a superior American military, which will be in a position to quickly mobilize in the defense of Taiwan. As such, the Chinese decision to exploit the crisis in Ukraine to launch its own assault against Taiwan is likely to be significantly influenced by the path to be followed by US in the Ukraine crisis as it unfolds.
[Photo by Arabani / Flickr]
Gurpreet Singh is a postgraduate research scholar at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), India. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
The author is a postgraduate research scholar at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), India.
