Revisiting Misperceptions: The 1962 Indo-China War

The idea that nation states accurately interpret the world is a presumption that underlines many scholarly explanations about why states behave the way they do. Robert Jervis contests this view and believes that perceptions of reality are influenced by a set of cognitive biases that affect how a nation responds. He defines misperceptions as miscalculations of consequences, inaccurate inferences, and misjudgments about how others will react to one’s policy. The paper, in this regard, attempts to explore how certain misperceptions on both sides of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) resulted into an unravelling series of events that switched the famous slogan of the time ‘Hindi Chini Bhai-Bhai’ to ‘Hindi Chini Bye-Bye’.  

Background 

It is axiomatic that reviewing history is the only key link to frame opinions on any International dispute. In this case, the root cause of the 1962 Indo-China war was the Chinese complex about India post 1947. It was a time when India’s philosophical and spiritual traditions were slowly gaining prominence. Many communist leaders understood that India was a progressive civilization from which China had much to borrow, including Buddhism. Yet, the Chinese were ignorant about the mid- 20th century India; an ideological perspective that led Chinese communists to view the country as a “stooge of Anglo-American diplomacy” directed by the British administration. Perhaps, Nehru’s difference of opinion that Tibet should be an independent country: added fuel to the Chinese mistrust. Adding to the chaos were the trembling legal grounds of 1914 Simla Convention signed between British India, China, and Tibet that claimed McMahon Line as a clear-cut demarcation between Tibet and India; which the Chinese profoundly refused to accept. 

The Turning Wave 

The first sign of discord between India and China appeared with the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950. China was aware that if Tibet remained outside its control, the nation would inevitably drift closer to India, with which it had deep religious and cultural affinity, geographical proximity and no history of hostility. Even so, “The thought process of India’s leaders on China was somewhat different”. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister harbored a generally benign view of China and its intentions towards Tibet. It’s important to note that Nehru personally preferred the autonomy of Tibet and believed that any communist liberation of the region should be peaceful; he did not want the issue to poison overall Indo-China relations. Anyway, to put an end to Chinese provocations, India signed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Panchsheel Agreement) in 1954. But things don’t always work out the way we want them to. China continued to consolidate its position in Tibet. In addition, it also started preparations to construct a road connecting Xinjiang with Tibet across Aksai Chin region. Meanwhile, India watched with “philosophic acquiescence” as the Chinese imposed Seventeen-Point Agreement on young Dalai Lama. 

Mutual suspicion between India and China mounted no later than 1957 when the Chinese went on to snatch Aksai Chin in Tibet. With each passing day, incidents of raid by the Chinese troops in India’s claimed territory became more frequent, and so did China’s claim for North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA)—the present day Arunanchal Pradesh. India was naturally concerned, but did not choose to react so far. Nonetheless, a significant turning point in the Indo-China relationship came with Nehru’s decision to support the 1959 Lhasa uprising. 

March 10, 1959 witnessed thousands of Tibetans gathered on the streets surrounding Potala Palace to protect Dalai Lama, who they feared was in danger of assassination by the Chinese. The protest was followed by a brutal crackdown that gathered massive support and sympathy leaving Indian government with no other choice than to grant asylum to Dalai Lama. China regarded this as an awful act of provocation.  They got infuriated because India not only decided to grant him asylum but also discussed the rebellion in their Parliament. The two contentions marked the deterioration of Sino-Indian relationship and brought us to where we are today. However, it would be interesting to contemplate how differently the relationship would have molded, had the cultural misperceptions been addressed. First, the Chinese failed to realize that India had put in efforts to curb the anti-Chinese propaganda. Second, Indian politicians had the liberty to talk about anything in the parliament. What happened consequentially were a number of Chinese incursions and border incidents.   

This caused India to realize that ‘Punishment is justified for the unjust’. Tired with the recurrent aggression, Indian army headquarters called for the Eastern and Western commands to raise the score of outposts and push patrols close to the McMahon line in NEFA and the India defined border in Ladakh. Called the forward policy, India’s faith on the strategy rested on the belief that China would not react militarily and instead withdraw from these regions. The assumption attested to be the greatest blunder on India’s side. Firstly, India was not militarily capable to handle any counter-responses. Nothing represents this better than the act of deploying brigade on a river line in Namka Chu. Secondly, the ill-fated policy triggered Mao’s insecurities to a great extent. Arjun Subramaniam claims that in 1961, Mao remarked to his generals, “Their (India’s) consistently pushing forward is like crossing the Chu Han boundary. What to do? We can set out a few pawns on our side of the river too. If they don’t cross over, good for them; if they do, we’ll eat them up”. The remark clearly reflects how reckless India was in executing Forward Policy in times when the ideal way would have been to take stock of situation and weigh in the repercussions before taking any measures. The negligence is widely believed to be both a result of cognitive limitations and administrative incompetence, about which Jervis talks in his first Hypothesis, “Decision makers tend to fit new information into their existing assumptions and theories.” 

A misperception that perhaps soured the relationship was India’s belief that a policy of appeasing China would win India favors with respect to the contested borders.  India, as a result, did not engage in preparations against the People’s Republic of China should the borders be contested. India’s strained relationship with Pakistan and non-aligned policy further narrowed her military options. 

The outcome was a sacrificing closure — a debacle. Mao understood that India was unwilling to negotiate the border to their satisfaction and so his ultimate objective became to “humiliate Nehru,” who was emerging as an influential Third World leader. 

The Conflict 

On Oct. 20, 1962, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attacked seven infantry Brigade on Namka Chu River and launched coordinated offensives in both western and eastern disputed territories. The locations were frightening. The war was fought on rugged terrain: at elevations of more than ten thousand feet. The tortuous logistics prevented deployment of Indian reinforcements— quickly favored Chinese, who had decent experience with light-infantry operations. Chinese numerical advantage was notable; and including reserves, the PLA enjoyed seven- to- one advantage over Indians. Ergo, by Oct. 24, Chinese infantry managed to clear both disputed areas, driving Indian forces away from the region. Some lull for negotiations ensued shortly after. 

In early-November, Zhou Enlai sent two letters to the Indian government suggesting that India and China should remain status quo in Aksai Chin. Notwithstanding the condition of settlement, Nehru dismissed the proposal on the ground that Chinese claim on Aksai Chin was illegal. On that account, the fighting resumed again. PLA won sizeable territories. Series of such attacks continued until Nov. 20, 1962, when China surprisingly declared a unilateral ceasefire and announced the withdrawal of PLA forces 20 kms from the Line of Actual Control.  

The conflict turned out to be an exceptional victory for China. The net gain in terms of territory was a 2,000 square km alpine desert in Ladakh between the two Chinese claimed lines. For India, the month-long humiliation slated a clear message, “The country of Gandhi must not abandon the path of peace, but be prepared for the wars.”

Lessons 

The battle, undoubtedly an achievement for China, projected not only its hard power, but, also a degree of forbearance. The success confirmed Chinese control over Tibet; perhaps laid a strong foundation of relationship between Pakistan and China. On the Indian side, the distressing defeat ruptured the government of Jawaharlal Nehru and left a serious impact on his health — Nehru died in less than two years after the war’s conclusion. Much introspection concludes that such a defeat is unlikely to occur in the future. Nevertheless, there are some lessons for India to grasp from the 1962 security failure. 

First, diplomacy can have no teeth in the absence of hard power. That said, defense preparedness is compulsory if a nation like India aspires to be a world power. 

Second, a nation should constantly review and re-build strong alliances. This is because during the 1962 war, India was left all alone to fend for herself despite being the leader of Non-Aligned movement. 

Third, fighting war is not only about ammunitions or weapons — Infrastructure plays a vital role. If a nation is unable to swiftly locate its forces on the border areas (like India could not in 1962); it will surely lose the war in-place. 

Fourth, there is always a need to modernize military as per new weapons and ammunitions. While the Chinese have made giant strides in the matter, India lagged and still lags behind. 

Lastly, armed forces should be an important part of a nation’s foreign policy. Unfortunately, India continues to keep the forces away from decision-making which might cost us sometime in the future.  

Legacy 

The Sino-Indian skirmish is known to spark India’s interest in military modernization. Within a decade, Soviet Union became a primary arms supplier for the nation and strengthened the military for 1965 and 1971 wars against Pakistan. However, the war failed to settle fundamental issues that divided India and China, for Delhi, who never agreed to the basic justice of Beijing’s claim. In an important sense, the issues now surrounding the Doklam Plateau are essentially the same as those left unsolved in 1962. Balance of power may have changed, but so has the geopolitical situation. Hoping that good sense prevails and Delhi-Beijing avoid replica of events that once occurred in October 1962.

The 1962 explosion of hostilities occurred due to conflicting perceptions on the Line of Actual Control. China has defied any solution all these years, considering that they use this controversy as a pressure point to keep India unbalanced. India must however, not make the mistake to resolve the border issue on China’s terms; no matter for how long the issue keeps hanging on fire. In the meantime, India needs to proceed with the improvement of infrastructure and military modernization in border areas. The 1962 war documents that India’s Himalayan frontier is at a severe military disadvantage. Diplomacy is, therefore, the only way forward, subject to building a component of trust; an element that has been missing in Indo-China relations for long. 

On a closing note, it would be correct to infer that states often have two tendencies when it comes to decoding the behavior of other states. One, they tend to overestimate the hostility of others or second, they underestimate the aggressiveness of the other. The former is especially baffling because it results in an unprovoked ‘defensive’ position by the states; pushing the opponent to resort to the same level of hostility it initially assumed. While misperceptions will always exist, it is important to be cognizant of the problem and design strategies that seek to address discrepancies. The notion is particularly relevant in the age of nuclear weapons where careful thought and deliberation is non-negotiable. Having said that, there is an urgent need for the nation states to strategize in a manner so as to alleviate and not catalyze the spiral. It’s true that the task in-hand is not an easy one but it can surely point out ways to escape the gridlock of historical inevitability. 

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.

Italy after BRIexit: The Indo-Pacific Newcomer

On March 23, 2019, Italy became the first G7 member to officially sign up for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Five years later,...

Russia, the West, and Churning Arctic Geopolitics

Amidst Vladimir Putin’s prolonged presidency in Russia, the conflict in Ukraine has persisted in the third year alongside escalating geopolitical tensions in the Arctic....

When Will Peace Talks Become an Option in the Russia-Ukraine War?

Amidst the cacophony of political discourse in the corridors of power in Washington D.C., one point seems to echo with bipartisan consensus: Ukraine must...