Pakistan became a Nuclear Weapon State on May 28, 1998 after successfully conducting five nuclear explosions in Ras Koh mountains located at the deserted outskirts of Chaghi district of Balochistan province. It has been 25 years since then, Pakistan acts as a responsible nuclear weapon state by making sure that this strategic weapon technology does not fall into the hands of irrational actors. However, it is imperative to explore misunderstandings people have about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and to elucidate the professionalism with which Pakistan protects its strategic assets.
The real question that many people ignore to ask is why Pakistan needed nuclear weapons at the first place. The answer can be simple yet complex at the same time, but it is self-explanatory; a mere historical analysis of Indo-Pak bilateral relations is required to comprehend it. Right after the partition in 1948, Pakistan fought its first war with India over Kashmir, in 1965 Indian incursion from the Eastern front was denied, but it was the 1971 fall of Dhaka that traumatized the country most and compelled the politico-military leadership to ponder upon the ways to deter India and neutralize its conventional superiority. Eventually, the 1974 Pokhran-I nuclear tests by India proved to be the ultimate factor for Pakistan embarking on the path to acquire nuclear weapons.
In simple terms, it was the Indian conventional superiority – real and ever-increasing threat- and to minimize this dominating threat perception, the politico-military leadership of Pakistan took a decision out of compulsion, not choice, to follow suit vis-à-vis its potential adversary.
Whereas, due to lack of understanding there are several questions that are mishandled by the ill-informed political and academic elites regarding the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program. These mishandling and lack of proper knowledge, regarding nuclear technology and its diplomatic use, created a huge gap in the existing literature regarding the rationale of Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons.
Similarly, many myths have emerged in that period. The most common myth that has been propagandized by Indian politicians, media persons, and scholars and by some prominent Western scholars for so long, is that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons may one day fall into the hands of non-state actors. Though the country had faced severe terrorism for a decade and a half, it never ever experienced any mishandling of nuclear material that is reported in the international community. On the other hand, in India, twice a uranium theft incidents were reported just last year and perpetrators were caught red-handed, but no punitive measures have been taken by the international community against this endangering trend.
Another factor associated with the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear installations is the lack of political stability in the country. In contrast, the historical evidence draws a very different picture of the national approach Pakistan’s politico-military leadership adopted when it comes to nuclear weapon program. Their national resolve is evident of how statesmen think irrespective of their personal gains whether it was Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, General Zia-ul-Haq, Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif, each one of them had their respective share of creating a history on May 28, 1998. Therefore, despite having manifold internal faults and flaws, Pakistan still managed to develop and test its nuclear capability for deterrence purposes.
Debate in the post nuclear test era revolved around the safety and security mechanisms. Pakistan developed a robust nuclear safety and security structure. The commanding authority is an amalgamation of both political and military leadership, also known as the National Command Authority (NCA) chaired by the Prime Minister and Strategic Plans Division (SPD) a secretariate that functions as an integral part of NCA that oversees the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear weapons and their related delivery systems.
Along with the many IAEA statements, Washington-based organization Nuclear Threat Initiative’s (NTI) 2020 report complements Pakistan’s efforts regarding nuclear safety and security. This credible report rated Pakistan above India in its nuclear safety index which clearly indicates that Pakistan is a very responsible nuclear state.
Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program is India-centric and does not threaten any other state in the region. Cold War era nuclear weapon development substantiate that states acquire nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes. Similarly, in the context of Pakistan and India, despite having a clear military imbalance, nuclear weapons do not only play a rule by deterring the potential adversary, but also Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons are for establishing a strategic balance thereby restoring strategic stability in South Asia. The post-nuclear weapon on ground developments also supports the deterrence arguments such as the Kargil Conflict, 2001-2 military standoff, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, Uri attack in 2016, and the most recent 2019 Pulwama Crisis. In each of these discussed hostile circumstances, India, despite possessing a vastly superior military, has refrained from attacking or launching a full-scale war against Pakistan due to the credibility of nuclear deterrence established in post May 1998 scenario.
This question has frequently been asked that what impact nuclear weapons have had on India-Pakistan relations. The post-May 1998 development in the realm of nuclear diplomacy may not be visible to the average person, but these strategic nuclear assets have attained long-term bilateral peace and regional stability. Similarly, as far as Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is concerned, it cannot be stalled due to some international pressure. As a matter of fact, it is very crucial for Pakistan’s national security and survival against seven times conventionally larger adversary, India.
[Photo by Government of Pakistan, via Wikimedia Commons]
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect TGP’s editorial stance.
The author is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), Quetta.
