The Russian military operations in Ukraine are a cause of massive concern for the international community. This is the largest kinetic military action seen post-World War II in the European theatre, the outcomes of which will have massive geopolitical implications around the world. This article attempts to probe from a geopolitical perspective the causes of the Russian military action in Ukraine despite knowing the massive costs involved.
The armed confrontation in Ukraine has brought to fore the relevance of geography to this day as one of the most important indicators of national security. Even though technology has empowered us to conquer numerous geographic limitations, one cannot dismiss that borders, mountains, deserts, forests, and oceans have always been significant frontiers and will continue to be so in the future. It is also important to note that modern geography is not just about the topographical aspects, but it also involves the organization and interactions of humans.
Russia’s Jinxed Geography
In his book ‘Prisoners of Geography’, Tim Marshall writes, “Geography has always been a prison of sorts – one that defines what a nation is or can be, and one from which our world leaders have often struggled to break free.” This quote particularly stands true for all Russian leaders who have tried to minimize the geographic disadvantage since time immemorial.
Towards the west of Russia lies the colossal Northern European Plain, which stretches from Poland, a narrow passage. However, it widens as it stretches eastwards (towards Russia), making it difficult to defend the vast expanse. Many Russian leaders have tried to take control of the narrow passage to safeguard this vulnerable spot for its security. Historically many countries have attacked Russia from the west. In 1601, the Polish could annex Moscow until they were constrained by a series of revolts against them by 1612. The Swedish invaded in 1708, but the Russian tactic of retreating while destroying the crops and livestock to prevent them from falling into the adversary’s hands eventually led to their defeat. The Napoleon-led invasion in 1812 and the German invasion in 1941 were forced back because of the sheer size of Russia and the inclement weather, which turned out to be a blessing in disguise.
In 1547, Ivan the Terrible started taking over neighboring states as a defensive tactic to avoid invasions. This remained in Russia’s strategic culture from the Russian Empire and was carried forward by the Soviets. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union implied the loss of territory for Russia in the West, which meant that it no longer had a geographic advantage.
This raises threat perceptions in Moscow since there has been a history of attacks across the North European Plain, which is why Russian leaders, even today, stress over safeguarding their western frontier. Another important aspect in securing its western frontiers is its population. European Russia is demarcated from Asia by the Ural Mountains. Even though the European side makes up a fourth of Russia’s land, almost three-quarters of the population resides there.
In today’s context, the West has been using the Northern European Plain to keep the Russian power in the region in check. This is the main reason why the Eastern European region has constantly been a theatre of conflict. NATO’s presence in the region has been the biggest threat for Russia; it has significant implications on the region’s stability and security. It is also essential to note Russia’s concerns regarding the missile defense systems installed by the United States in Poland and Romania. The missile defense systems are not a direct threat, but it addresses a prospect or a possibility of a build-up of missile network in Europe that could nullify Russia’s first or second-strike capabilities. This dispossesses any possibility of Moscow restoring its hegemony over Eastern and Central Europe. The inability to retain control over the Plains is a situation that raises serious alarms in Russia since its defense would be limited to air and land defenses. Its naval force is constrained due to the ice in the north and the narrow straits elsewhere. Moreover, another hindrance is the vast landmass of the country, which makes it difficult to mobilize resources in a short period during a crisis. Over time, these circumstances have directed the Russian Foreign Policy.
Tracking the Russian Threat Perceptions
Post the Cold War, there was a brief period wherein authorities who used to be favorable to the West were in power like Boris Yeltsin. He exclusively looked out for opportunities for Russia to cooperate with the West and was also passionate about remodeling Russian institutions like that of the West. Moscow in 1991-1992 intended to apply for a NATO Membership, some senior Russian leaders nonchalantly referenced their ‘vision’ of Russia in the European Union as well.
Notwithstanding Putin’s grim verbosity towards the West, in his initial term as President, he pursued collaboration and coordination with the West. He was eager to fortify Russia’s relationship with NATO and actively tried to create a space for itself in NATO and endeavor to turn into the United States’ most significant partner. In a speech in Bundestag Germany, he called for a flourishing Greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok, also encouraging a common economic space.
However, it was the elites who understood that they had got far less than what they had anticipated. The West did not make it suitable for the Russians to join significant establishments-including NATO, the EU, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), since the Russian interests were being ignored. Multiple variables during the 2000s added to the developing distrust between the West and Russia. It was established that Russian interests could not be accomplished through assimilation with the Western institutions. Russia was let down because it could not impact the NATO decision-making when they meddled in the Kosovo war without UN authorization. Even the Russian liberals were taken aback by the constant bombing against Serbia, a European country with close ties to Moscow. Many of the previous Russian satellite states started to become a part of the EU and NATO to add to more problems. Russia did not receive such moves well, which considered this a US encroachment upon the Russian sphere of influence. What added more to the dismay was the setback of the Western aid in the economic crunch – the 1998 Asian Crisis where Russia was heavily affected, followed by defiance against the Russian accession to the WTO. In the early 2000s, the color revolutions that broke out in its near-abroad further led to the Russians perceiving the US-led order as a grave threat to their national security.
After the outbreak of color revolutions in the post-Soviet states, Putin targeted certain human rights and pro-democracy organizations, hinting at a Western hand in the events. According to Russia, the crackdown was just a reaction to the various attempts made to threaten Russia’s sovereignty and reduce the Western presence and influence in the CIS region. Russia repudiated states that chose to keep their relations with the West; countries like Ukraine and Georgia paid the price.
Ukraine: Russia’s priced possession?
Ukraine and Russia share historical ties. In the ninth century, several clans assembled to form the Kievan Rus, the predecessors of the Russians. They were settled in the city of Kiev and its encompassing regions, which is present-day Ukraine. After the aggression of the Mongols, the strength of the Kievan Rus debilitated, and the focal point of power moved to the Grand Principality of Moscovy, which is currently Moscow.
Ukraine is the main impetus behind the Russian policy towards its western frontiers in the post-Soviet space. Ukraine joining the Western camp would bring about a shift in the balance of power in Europe. It would end all expectations for Russia to make a Slavic Union which would consist of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Russia would never be able to re-establish Soviet authority in the post-Soviet space. Zbigniew Brzezinski once said that Russia would stop being a Eurasia power if it ultimately lets go of Ukraine. It is geographically situated at a very strategic location. Hence, if Russia finds a way to dominate Ukraine indirectly, they would have control of over 43 million individuals and a rich farming base. Russia has certain limitations in independently maintaining its food security due to unfavorable climatic conditions and geography.
On the other hand, as Ukraine is often referred to as the breadbasket of Europe, maintaining control over this region would secure most of Moscow’s food security needs, particularly during winters. Moreover, controlling Ukraine would also mean having access to the Black Sea, subsequently turning Russia into a regional power.
The Russian Black Sea Fleet has been docked at Sevastopol in Crimea, Ukraine, for a long time. This is a warm water port on the Black Sea, which gives Russia access to the Atlantic Ocean. This course of action worked smoothly until the outbreak of the Maidan Revolution and Ukraine’s intentions of being a part of the European Union. These events led to a souring of relations between the two countries. In 2014, when the tensions were at a peak, Russia was able to take control of Crimea and thus secured its only warm water port.
War is not desirable for any country. Nevertheless, the Russian military actions in Ukraine openly highlight the Russian threat perceptions. The Western media has been condemning the Russian actions rightly, but while giving the West a clean chit. The purpose of NATO was to keep the Soviets at bay. Post the collapse of the Soviet Union, what purpose does the existence of NATO serve? However, it has been expanding rapidly by admitting the post-Soviet states, raising serious doubts about their intentions. The expansion began in 1999 when Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary became member states, followed by the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania in 2004. Albania and Croatia in 2009, Montenegro in 2017, and Macedonia in 2020 are the most recent entrants into the NATO fold.
Russia has been very vocal about the expansion of NATO eastwards as a major threat to its national security. This is because NATO is a collective security organization. Its crux lies in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which explicitly states, “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them; all.” This means that Ukraine’s joining NATO would effectively bring the US and its allies’ strike capabilities to its Western border. On the other hand, before the conflict broke out, Putin tried various other measures like diplomacy and negotiations with countries, articulating his apprehensions clearly. It seems to be clear now that the West never ceased to stop looking at the Russian Federation as a threat, despite various efforts by the Russians to integrate within the liberal framework.
Moreover, none of the countries involved have made efforts to decipher the Minsk conundrum. Why has only one country been criticized for not following it and the other left out? For all the democratic values the West stands for, neither the United States nor NATO intends to participate in the war that Ukrainians have been fighting alone for now. The arms dealers in the US are reaping the benefits of the war by selling arms to Ukraine.
It is quite odd for a leader to trust a distant power and believe they will come to their aid when needed while turning against the adversary with whom one shares a border.
Are innocent lives being lost because of this egotistical approach of states?
Or are we still blinded by ideologies?
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
Vidhee Makwana is a Postgraduate Research Scholar at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), India.
