Several weeks after the historic US-Taliban agreement in Doha, the situation in Afghanistan has changed dramatically with a prevailing political crisis that seems to be more intractable than any other time in the last two decades. Contrary to the promises of both parties, the war continues while the hope for peace is slimming because of the lingering crisis in the country. Disappointed in Afghan leaders, Secretary Mike Pompeo recently slashed $1 billion worth in aid to the state after his shuttle diplomacy failed to broker a power-sharing deal between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah, who, both declared themselves President and simultaneously held inauguration ceremonies on March 9th.
In Washington, the opportunity to finally end the U.S.’s longest war outweighs any criticism about the confusing parameters of the deal. On the other hand, in Kabul, some significant players, including President Ashraf Ghani, is only reluctantly cooperating with Ambassador Khalilzad, the U.S. peace envoy who is pushing to convene the intra-Afghan dialogue, especially now that the March 10th agreement to start the intra-Afghan dialogue deadline has passed.
The initial political resistance to the Doha accords, including President Ghani’s decision not to release 5,000 Taliban prisoners or to name a negotiating team, indicates that reconciling conflicting interests of the Afghan players will not be an easy task in the future. However, optimistic policymakers’ hoped that Afghanistan’s September 2019 presidential election would deliver a legitimate president who could unify the nation, ease the U.S. military withdrawal, and lead the intra-Afghan dialogue with the Taliban.
This did not happen obviously. Ghani’s reelection remains clouded in controversy, surrounded by doubts of the impartiality of the electoral commissions. Both Ghani and his main electoral rival, Abdullah Abdullah, have held inauguration ceremonies declaring themselves president. Representatives of the international community attended Ghani’s ceremony at a low level, while Abdullah’s ceremony was joined by Afghanistan’s powerful political elites. The current election conundrum continues to undermine the peace process. It is too risky to endure even several more weeks of uncertainty to start the intra-Afghan dialogue, and there cannot be a peace process without a legitimate governing entity in Kabul.
For this reason, the only way to bring these two processes together is to create a Government of National Reconciliation with Ghani responsible for governance and Abdullah in charge of the peace and reconciliation efforts. The GNR would be fundamentally different from the National Unity Government (NUG) that was established after the 2014 disputed election. Unlike the NUG, which had a reform agenda, the mandate of the GNR will be to focus on negotiations with the Taliban in order to reach a political settlement. Meanwhile, its executive and administrative scope would be circumscribed by limiting the president to abuse his political power by introducing an executive Prime Minister. Moreover, the GNR main goal would essentially be to decentralize the political power and pave the way towards peace and reconciliation. In this regard, the Afghan Parliament as a legislative branch of the government can effectively monitor over the new political structure in order to ensure its oversight. However, it would have a minor practical impact on the work of the GNR beyond confirming ministers and introducing legislative pieces.
On the other hand, a coordinated donor effort to only fund essential functions of the government while negotiations would reduce the possibilities of corruption and emphasize on the need to kick off the peace process. It is because the beginning of the Afghan peace process and reaching a political settlement is of paramount for the international community as well as the Afghan people.
In this vein, the GNR would have an opportunity to name a national representative team, which would ideally be comprised of the younger generation who are more politically astute and have a direct stake in engaging with the Taliban. Moreover, the new government could also name an authoritative national reconciliation council to set the broad parameters of the government’s position. The President can be part of this council or even could lead the body, but his executive role would have to be decided based on the consent of its members.
It is important to mention that within this broad structural conception of the GNR, many details would have to be worked out among the political parties and government representatives. The record of Afghan elites in finding consensus or even thinking of the long term is hardly positive in the recent history of the country. But this proposal would at least establish some structural incentives in a way that is more conducive to consensus building than the questionable election of a weak president who has divided the people along ethnic and regional lines. Politically speaking things have moved far beyond the realm of ideal outcomes. Too many opportunities have been squandered and we are now in the realm of last chances that await the country.
Therefore, the structure of any future government itself should focus on a broad-based government in Afghanistan that incorporates the Taliban as a major political player, but certainly not dominated by the group since a Taliban controlled Afghanistan is neither acceptable for the Afghan people nor its international partners and supporters. Thus, it’s equally importantly for the international community to support a future national government that is represented by all Afghans including the Taliban.
Toward this end, the international community should focus on supporting a responsible government that does not spare any effort to use the resources and aids in building the country and working towards long-lasting peace with the Taliban. For this reason, the international community should use its power to persuade the Afghan elites to form a national government that is acceptable for the people of Afghanistan as well as the international community which has invested in blood and treasure during the last two decades.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
The author is a Fullbright scholar and a graduate of New York University. He is also a fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy. He has served in the Afghan independent election commission in the past and can be reached via twitter @FroghTabish.
