Living With War : Afghanistan a Fact Check
War in the context of Afghanistan has been normalized as a part of the Afghan life through the series of wars since 1978, to contemporary times. The actors, the ideologies, the intensity and duration changing, war remains ostensible, and this includes the social and political dynamics, issues of gender, and the shifting relationships between tribal, sectarian, and regional communities. The 40 years of War, violence, and military intervention, both local and global in Afghanistan has affected the lives and network of communities in that country. The global engagements of the USA, in particular, attempts to assess the impact of the prolonged War in Afghanistan inside out and steadily resurrect a democratic government favourably inclined to the terms and conditions preset by the US and its favoured partners. Neil Young’s war protest song titled ‘Living with War’ (2006) ‘I’m living with war every day; I’m living with war in my heart every day; I’m living with war right now’ sums up the cacophony of voices that echoes the geopolitical spaces of the Afghan world.
The study involved multilocational interviews (both in Nepal and India) conducted in parts to suit the timings and needs of both the interviewer and the interviewee between the years 2009 and 2019. Weaving the personal interviews of men who served in Afghanistan contacted through snowball sampling from the two countries the discussions in this paper complicates the issues of securitization for peace, outsourced labour from developing nations and hierarchies of labour and logistics in conflict areas, etc. In doing so, the discussions bring to the fore the nuanced role played by the Gorkha both from India and Nepal, and their conditioning by the ever-changing dynamics of foreign policies in operation and their assisted role and services in the US intervention in Afghanistan post 9/11.
The study brings to the fore the very webbed nature of migrations or mobility in the trans-Himalayan settings that circumvent and also at times reaffirms many of the current understanding of human movements from rural to urban, urban to the centres of the metropole and conflict zones. The study, in this sense, complicates the spatial mobility of the Gorkha in Afghanistan. The study affirms that the contested claims to the ‘shared heritages of the Gorkha’ continue to operate even in conditions of migration elsewhere. Silhouetted on these vexed issues, the discussion analyses the outsourcing of Gorkha from South Asia that conjures the image of a formidable yet vulnerable ‘Global Gorkha’ workforce.
The American intervention for peace and building democracy in such conflict-ridden territories has hastened the traffic of outsourced labour through a webbed network of fuzzy contracting companies that hire outsourced labour from countries like Nepal and India on the US governments’ behalf. These recruiting agencies have been held responsible for channeling the global flow migrants from less developed regions to global conflict zones. This has involved risking the lives of misinformed/ill-informed labour and conning the migrants nearest kith and kin in cases of death through denial of compensation. The flow of outsourced labour in its myriad forms to conflict zones across the globe, such as in Afghanistan post 9/11 despite the visible threats and dangers, has continued unabated. The US taxpayers’ dollars are pumped through multiple layers of contracting and subcontracting, albeit the presence of laws and organizational design to prevent the same. These contracting agencies and their nexus have milked political unrest, governmental instability, acute conditions of poverty, unemployment, and the desire to earn in ‘dollars’ in countries like Nepal and India. These contracting agencies have significantly profited off the war economy – in using the American legal system to shield themselves from any accountability for their operation in and out of Afghanistan.
‘Private security firms in the early 9/11 phase in Afghanistan sought to hire ex-British Army Gurkhas, i.e., those experienced to work in combat situations. The policy rumblings within Nepal and the takeover of securitization for peace in Afghanistan by the US-backed agencies led to the identification and replacement of the Nepalese ex-British Gurkhas by civilian Gorkhas from India and Nepal with zero or limited military experience and marketing them as brave “Gurkhas”’ (Personal Interviews. Mahesh Rai, 2019; Bhim Thatel, 2019). ‘The nature of the work performed by the Gorkhas changed from that of mercenaries in a combat situation to that of outsourced labour manning security’ (Jay Subba. Personal Interview. 2019). In most cases, the outsourced labour was procured for cooking, cleaning, providing security, guarding supply convoys, etc., and not directly linked to the traditional roles assigned to the US military. Also, the US companies involved in the recruitment process were highly diversified, and subcontracting to third or fourth country recruitment agencies was the norm.
The case of Gorkha from Nepal
Nepal, for various factors, has engaged in supplying human resources to multiple post-war rebuilding engagements across the globe. The Nepalese labour, in this sense, has taken a global turn and become a formidable face of ‘labouring under Fire.’ The lack of formal institutional frameworks and concerns for these multitudes of labour forces makes labouring in foreign lands an uncertain one. These migrants remain in conditions of vulnerability and precarity in ‘service ghettos’ of war ridden countries such as Afghanistan. Fourteen Nepalese guards were killed in a suicide blast in Afghanistan near Pol-e Charkhi prison outside the capital when it came under attack about 5:40 am (Afghan time) 20th June 2016. The Nepalese security guards used to reside seven kilometres away from the Canadian embassy and commuted from their point of accommodation to the embassy on a bus. The incident was reported as the deadliest strike on migrant workers from Nepal and India in current memory in Afghanistan.
While they underwent painful, expensive treatment for broken bones and head injuries, the men were informed that Sabre International (a private security firm contracted to manage the guards) had lowered the insurance cap of $300,000 to $30,000. The survivors and relatives of those who lost their lives serving the Canadian embassy challenged the Canadian government and the recruiting agency Sabre and sought compensations and insurance benefits. ‘The lawsuit aimed at correcting discriminatory practices towards migrant labour forces from Nepal and India who till that time were treated as mere “third world labour”’ (Jay Subba. Personal Interview. 2019). The ambiguity of the Nepalese governments labour policies and the organizational design to act as safety nets for outsourced labour in Afghanistan is aggravated by the absence of the diplomatic presence of Nepal in Afghanistan. These ambiguities make it difficult to ascertain accurate figures of Nepalese Gorkha migrants working as cogs and pegs in the US-driven rebuilding exercise post 9/11. Following the 2016 attacks on Nepalese outsourced labour near the Canadian Embassy at Kabul, the Department of Foreign Employment (Government of Nepal) stated that it issued 9000 permits to work only in the ‘Green Zone’ at Kabul. This claim of the Nepalese government of the permit to work only in the ‘Green Zone’ in Kabul is technically challenging to understand for the simple reason the ‘outsourced labour’ has no agency to choose where to be stationed, and that the international facilities are scattered in various provinces. The questions about the legal status of the Nepalese outsourced labour in Afghanistan, the concerns about the rampant corruption and bureaucratic entanglements within the Nepalese government worsens the trust issues of these migrants towards their home government thereby resulting in non-reporting of illegal or overstaying presence, fake passports, extortion, torture, sexual exploitation, etc.
The interviewees informed that intermediaries acted as brokers (charging brokerage commission) and introduced them to nodal persons (charging labour commission) in the recruiting agencies in Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Pokhra, Dhanusha and Janakpur (Nepal), Delhi, Siliguri, Darjeeling, Chennai, Mumbai (India) and those in Dubai (UAE) and Afghanistan (Personal Interviews. Mahesh Rai; Bhim Thatel; Hem Prasad Neupaney; Jay Subba). The process involved the payment of approximately NRP 3,50000 to the multilayered agencies and their middlemen either in full or in installments by those seeking secured jobs, including visas and permits in Afghanistan (Personal Interviews. Mahesh Rai; Bhim Thatel; Hem Prasad Neupaney; Jay Subba). Few also mentioned that individuals had the option to enter Afghanistan with 30 days entry visa through liaison with the local middlemen there and pay less than the amount paid for services from Nepal or India (Personal Interviews: Raju Lohar; Rajen Biswakarma; Biswas Lama; Pankaj Bharailey). However, this channel of moving to Afghanistan without a job guarantee and work permit from local agencies or agencies located in Afghanistan involved risk and often resulted in the exploitation of migrants, especially after the expiry of the visa. They also mentioned that the mobility of the outsourced labour was highly restricted and confined only to specific areas. Those without proper documents or long-term visas were kept in conditions of confinement in camps or compound and paid substandard wages (Personal Interviews: Mahesh Rai; Bhim Thatel; Hem Prasad Neupaney; Jay Subba). The limited mobility also meant limited digital access, thereby making this category of outsourced labour the most vulnerable (Personal Interviews: Mahesh Rai; Bhim Thatel; Hem Prasad Neupaney; Jay Subba). Those interviewed also mentioned that they had to hand over their passports, visas, and other documents to their recruiting agency or their reporting leader. Those who arrived using the illegal network got their passports, visas, and related papers confiscated by their employers or the nexus at the airport. These were returned only later at the termination or completion of the contract.
A study committee formed by the government to look into improving the ‘Nepal Foreign Employment Act (2007); Foreign Employment Regulation (2008)’ and the work environment for Nepalese workers in Afghanistan in its report to Ministry of Labour and Employment recommended measures to ensure their safety. It concluded that sending labour to Afghanistan is ‘not too risky,’ the committee in its report has stressed on the need for a recruitment agency or the employer to provide mandatory insurance of the workers, fixing the salary and ensuring accommodation of the workers within the ‘green zone.’ ‘Those working in Afghanistan post 9/11 are mostly retired sepoys from the Indian Army, the Assam Rifles or those who earlier worked in Bahrain. While serving in Afghanistan, they took up jobs such as that of security guards in foreign missions, UN agencies, and multinational companies, which the government defined as ‘green zone’’ (Hem Prasad Neupaney. Personal Interview. 2019).
‘The killing of the Nepalese security guards in Afghanistan and the series of reporting in Nepalese media about the mistreatment of the Nepalese migrant labour in Afghanistan resulted in the Government of Nepal taking stiff measures. The ban on the Nepalese labour forces from seeking employment in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria left those seeking greener pastures for employment to try out other 106 labour destinations approved by the Nepal government (Bhim Thatel. Personal Interview. 2019).
‘Those Nepalese migrants stranded in Afghanistan were entangled in a dilemma of legality and illegality following the ban by the Nepal government. For instance, those who had come home for a vacation were unable to return to their jobs in Afghanistan. While those who were stranded back in Afghanistan had to resort to other illegal channels to prolong their stay even after the expiry of their visas/tourist permits, such circumvents leaving them vulnerable working without a break 10-14 hours 24X7’ (Mahesh Rai. Personal Interviews: Mahesh Rai, 2019; Rupen Tamang, 2019; Roman Subba, 2019).
The ban imposed by Nepal attracted a fisted response from past migrants. They mentioned that ‘the Indian Gorkhas will grasp the opportunity to earn in dollars,’ and that ‘the Nepal government should either provide 100 days labour in Nepal through the Employment Programme or responded more effectively and challenge the Canadian counterpart as well as the government of Afghanistan rather than adopt a blanket ban on the flow of labour to Afghanistan’ (Personal Interviews: Mahesh Rai; Bhim Thatel; Hem Prasad Neupaney; Jay Subba). The Nepal government officially marked the presence of 3,323 Nepalese as legal migrants working in Afghanistan. The attraction to serve in war-torn countries such as Afghanistan came mostly due to the high pay, conversion advantage, and higher remittances (Personal Interviews: Mahesh Rai; Bhim Thatel; Hem Prasad Neupaney; Jay Subba). The salary and allowance of security guards employed in Afghanistan ranged from $950 to $3,000 per month, and in most cases, they were paid far lower than promised in the contract. Those interviewed from India mentioned ‘the less challenging nature of work’, as well as the sedentary or straightforward tasks given to the migrants, such as ‘just standing’ and keeping a watchful eye on the movement of ‘local Afghani people.’ They had to be vigilant each time these ‘problem people’ entered inside the base camps to collect garbage or needed to access the godowns and car sheds for cleaning and retrieval of scrap’ as reasons for attraction to work in Afghanistan post 9/11 (Passang Yolmo. Personal Interview. 2014). Those interviewed mentioned that in War-torn Afghanistan ‘the scrap,’ and disposal and reuse of American scrap dumped as garbage from these American (and other western) Army base camps and offices had a lucrative market in the ‘black market’ and were in high demand by the contending warlords and factions of the Taliban. Amidst precarity ‘the scrap’ reinvented new meanings and value for itself as a valuable resource item to be collected or stolen, resold, remodeled, or melt to become something else. In this engagement of collecting disposed items, even children were entrusted with the task and given paltry sum. Post-war Afghanistan has a large number of children living in the streets, exposed to the vulnerabilities of the “world outside the relatively safer shelters of ‘shelter homes’ and their families.” These children become pegs in the larger grid ‘black market of scrap’, drug/ substance abuse, and sexual abuse.
The case of Gorkha from India
India’s relation with Afghanistan though embedded historically and socio-culturally receptive to each other, has remained mostly ambivalent. The ambivalence can be construed through India’s shifting position towards the Taliban and the changing regimes in Afghanistan, vis-a-vis the presence of the US and Pakistan in Afghanistan. Amidst series of kidnappings of Indian workers in Zaranj-Delaram highway in the Afghan province of Nimruz and attacks on the Indian Embassy and consulates after 2008 the ambiguities in the official labour policy and the irregular flow a sizeable migrant for labour and security to Afghanistan continues through the legal as well as through irregular channels. The mutual attractions of India and the US post 9/11 has weaved exciting patterns in the flow of ethnically vibrant migrants from India as well as Nepal to make entry points in strategic security ports in Afghanistan. Those interviewed in Nepal mentioned that using the land route from Nepal via India to the destinations abroad was cheaper and enabled them to avoid the nexus of agents and corrupt customs officials at Kathmandu Airport (Personal Interviews: Raju Lohar; Rajen Biswakarma; Biswas Lama; Pankaj Bharailey; Roman Subba; Rupen Tamang). Also, few mentioned that they temporarily camped themselves in Delhi and worked in restaurants, and honed their skills in cooking and housekeeping/ billeting and saved money to pay the middlemen and agents in Delhi and Mumbai (Personal Interviews: Biswas Lama; Roman Subba; Rupen Tamang).
Recruiting companies like AC First, AECOM (US-based global network of experts) with chains of regional and local recruitment agencies provided a platform for ‘take-off’ for these migrants (Personal Interviews: Passang Yolmo, 2014; Tenzing Bhutia, 2012; Sangay Sherpa, 2012; Norden Lama, 2012; Nakul Sharma, 2012; Kundan Kumai, 2012). These ex-outsourced labour neatly outlined their footprints of migration from Darjeeling, Eastern Himalayas to Chennai, to Mumbai, then to Dubai, and after that to destinations such as Jalalabad in Afghanistan. Those with relatives/friends in Afghanistan or those well connected through ‘friends’ in the US Army had to pay as less as INR 18000. The respondents mentioned that during their transit stay at Dubai, the AC First recruiting agency and the US army personnel took charge of their movement and hoisted them at Holiday Inn (Dubai) a star hotel and paid each of them $50 per day as ‘pocket money.’ They were dropped at the airport in a taxi, to board Aerotek and fly to US Airbase at Jalalabad (Personal Interviews: Passang Yolmo, 2014; Tenzing Bhutia, 2012; Sangay Sherpa, 2012; Norden Lama, 2012). Few respondents mentioned unambiguous terms and conditions of their service in Afghanistan, for instance, 6 months contract subject to renewal and extension, 20 days BBC (Break between contract) holiday, 30 days RnR (Rest and Recreation), etc. Those in charge of security of the US Army base in Afghanistan were expected to be strictly detached from the local population in and around the camp. They were to keep an eye on the local Afghan people entering the US camp for housekeeping/billeting, collecting garbage, and check the smuggling of parts of vehicles, scrap metal or computer, etc., from the US camps to outside the boundary. They mentioned that the US goods, including scraps from the dump yards inside the base camps, were in considerable demand in black-markets of Afghanistan. The US recruiting agencies considered Indians, mainly Indian Gorkha, to be trustworthy and placed them at strategic check-posts within the camps to perform ‘Customs and Borders Protection’ (CBP). ‘The Gorkha were to escort and shadow any suspect.’ ‘The Gorkha from India had ‘Green Badges’ a sign of advantage because of their ability to speak and follow the English language. Those from Nepal were given ‘Yellow Badges’ to denote that they were linguistically challenged (i.e., not conversant in English)’ (Personal Interviews: Passang Yolmo, 2014; Tenzing Bhutia, 2012; Sangay Sherpa, 2012; Norden Lama, 2012).
The suspect of the past Nepalese migrants that the Indian Gorkha will milk the opportunity to work and earn in Afghanistan does not hold water. The Indian Gorkha like the diverse mix of labour forces from Southern and Western India were already serving in various sectors in the post 9/11 rebuilding program of Afghanistan. For instance, Anurag Chhetri Rana mentioned that ‘the Gorkha of Darjeeling post-2007 have continued to serve in Afghanistan and assist the US in the rebuilding of the war-torn country’ (Anurag Chhetri Rana. Personal Interview. 2009). ‘The Gorkha from Darjeeling have used private agencies, mainly those linked with the USA to find recruitment as Security contractors in Afghanistan’ (Dil Bahadur Bhandari. Personal Interview. 2013). Nikhil Tamang (2013) and Simba Mukhia’s (2014) interviews also substantiate this point.
We can construe that ‘moving out’ into post 9/11 Afghanistan is not without its challenges. Afghanistan is multiply gated. The 40 years of War, violence, and military intervention, both local and global in Afghanistan has affected the lives and network of communities in that country. The global engagements of the USA in the prolonged war in Afghanistan and the steady resurrection of democracy through a complex web of outsourced labour predominantly from India and Nepal provides insightful glances into the ever-changing geopolitics and continuation of primordial dynamics in international politics. These 20 interviews of men who served as cogs and pegs in the post 9/11 US-driven blueprint in Afghanistan raises pertinent issues of securitization for peace, outsourced labour from developing nations and hierarchies of labour and logistics in conflict areas, etc., and, the mundane but deeply nuanced role played by the marketing of ‘brave Gorkha’ both from India and Nepal as the indispensable ‘Global Gorkha’ workforce in select zones of war-torn geographies.
[I thank the respondents for agreeing to answer my questions and sharing their experiences in Afghanistan. Their responses and observations substantiate and shape my arguments in this study. I apologize if they feel let down, and any shortcomings are solely mine. Names and identifying details have been changed to protect the identities of the respondents. I acknowledge the institutional support of the Netaji Institute for Asian Studies, Kolkata to conduct the field study at Nepal.]
The author is an Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science & Political Studies, Netaji Institute for Asian Studies, Kolkata; and member Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group (MCRG), Kolkata. Also Visiting Faculty, Department of South and South East Asian Studies (SSEAS), University of Calcutta.
