As the world fixed its eyes on the war in Ukraine, the government in Beijing was eerily quiet in making any substantial comments. The Chinese ambassador to the United Nations still calls for peace and de-escalation in the recent UN Security Council meeting. Yet, there is no clear sign from the speech that China sides explicitly with Russia, its strategic ally.
At the same time, the Chinese government lifts Russian wheat export regulations, allowing all Russian wheat to enter China. Yet, two out of the four state-owned major banks have regulated commodity trades with Russia, and one of them is the Bank of China, the primary handler of foreign exchange services. This restriction could further hinder the Russian economy despite all the incoming sanctions.
This Chinese neutrality towards Moscow’s action is not something new. China remained relatively inactive after the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization entered Almaty, Kazakhstan to crack down on the protest. Despite China’s growing interests and influence in the region, Beijing still chose not to take significant actions in Central Asia. China only released a statement saying that China trusts Kazakhstan in properly handling its domestic affairs.
Suppose we combine China and Russia’s action from January’s Kazakh protest to the ongoing war in Ukraine. In that case, it’s easy to see the China-Russia alliance is not as assertive as the outsiders expected. The significant events in 2022, namely the war in Ukraine and the protest in Kazakhstan, reveal the crack of the seemingly formidable alliance.
The recent Ukrainian war unveils the divide between Beijing and Moscow. Beijing remained quiet and consistent in its stance on the issue. From the regular press conference to the speech at the emergency meeting at the UN Security Council, China remained neutral. China believes the crisis in the region was created by “many complex factors.” Beijing also mentioned that it makes decisions based on the “merits of the matter itself.” These statements prove that China does not explicitly support one side in Ukraine issues.
As President Xi spoke with Putin recently, there is no clear sign that the two countries have reached a consensus. According to the official news report, the two leaders “exchanged their opinions.” Putin criticized the Ukrainian government and the West for ignoring Russia’s security concerns. Xi Jinping, meanwhile, called for negotiation and a peaceful solution to the current issue. It seems as if the two leaders are talking on their own terms.
To make matters worse, the ongoing war and the incoming sanctions imposed on Russia will severely damage Chinese economic interests. Russia is a major transitioning point for BRI and China-Europe Railway. The incoming sanctions will inevitably harm the China-Europe Railway, damaging Chinese financial interest both at home and abroad. Meanwhile, Central Asian currencies, like Kazakhstani tenge and Kyrgyzstani som, suffer a drastic devaluation. The two countries participate closely in BRI, further hindering BRI and Chinese economic interests.
Beyond the ongoing war in Ukraine, the expansionist tendency from Moscow has also driven China into dissatisfaction. Putin mentioned the historical context to justify his behavior, alerting both the former Soviet countries and Beijing. If Putin can apply historical context in Ukraine, he can also imply the same context to China. In the recent press conference, China subtly mentioned and criticized this concern that China does not believe “should one country flagrantly undermine others’ sovereign security for its own military advantage and absolute security.”
At the same time, Central Asia also witnessed China and Russia’s clashing interests. The Russian influence in the region is, in fact, in decline. While Central Asian countries deliberately latinize their language and abolish the Cyrillic alphabet, their national language promotion also begins. The Russian-speaking population in Central Asia is in significant decline. Meanwhile, as Russia has suffered from the economic decline since the 2014 Crimea crisis, the Central Asians also suffered greatly. There have been talks about breaking away from the Russian system for quite some time now. Russian influence in the region could only be further shrinking.
At the same time, China has become a growing power in Central Asia. Central Asia plays a vital role in China’s BRI. China has a solid and increasing investment in Central Asia; its companies actively participate in construction and mining. Sinooil, a branch of China National Petroleum Company, operates the industrial oil production chain, from extraction to gas station management. Its gas stations are in all corners of Kazakhstan, from downtown Almaty to the remote part of west Kazakhstan. The cultural exchange in education and language between China and Central Asia has also grown fast in the past years.
As China pushes for the link through Belt and Road Initiative, the relationship between China and the Central Asian countries grew closer. In the recent Winter Olympics in Beijing, all the Central Asian leaders traveled to Beijing to participate in the Opening Ceremony and meet President Xi Jinping. This level of engagement clearly shows the close relationship between China and the Central Asian countries.
The clash of interests for Beijing and Moscow in Central Asia did not stop at political and economic issues. The coexistence of SCO and CSTO could further indicate the divide between China and Russia. The Kazakhstan protest successfully revived the CSTO and its security mechanism despite some worried about the intervention, arguing that this hinders Kazakh sovereignty. SCO did not provide any military assistance but released a statement. While SCO was more active in the previous years with military exercises and cooperation, it lacks the fundamental mechanism to provide help and participation when needed. This clash of interests in security cooperation could further drag the current alliance down.
Admittedly, the alliance between Beijing and Moscow is still strong. China still heavily emphasizes the United States and the eastward expansion of NATO in the recent press conference while not mentioning Russia. China lifted the import regulation for Russian wheat. These indeed reflect on the sturdiness of the Beijing-Moscow alliance. Yet, the collapse of all the great dams starts from one tiny crack. There are already cracks between Beijing and Moscow in other issues, and the recent events in Kazakhstan and Ukraine could widen that crack.
[Photo by Presidential Press and Information Office, Russia/Wikimedia Commons]
Henry Huang serves as the Research and Communications Assistant at the DPRK Strategic Research Center in KIMEP University in Almaty, Kazakhstan. He graduated with a Bachelor’s degree from the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
