With a 1,864 mile range, Ukraine’s new FP-5 “Flamingo” cruise missile, represents an interesting advance in Ukraine’s offensive capabilities as war with Russia rages on. The fact that Ukraine has opted for cruise—rather than ballistic—missiles, is testament to its pragmatic analysis of cost-efficiency ratios. Should Europe follow suit?
The United States, Russia and China are already providing some answers, having set aside ballistic missiles in favor of Long-Range Hypersonic Weapons (LRHW) and Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGV). But at $41 million per missile, this type of weaponry is beyond the reach of European budgets. In Europe, the priority in terms of deep-strike capability procurement remains to regain a missing capability that is available in significant volumes and at short notice, rather than a few very high-end missiles.
As the war continues, and as relations with the Trump administration remains volatile, European defensive procurement strategies are indeed entering a decisive phase. Gaps in air defense, stockpiles and deep-precision strike (DPS) capacities have been brutally exposed. As internal debates take shape, European governments must decide whether to channel limited resources into ballistic missile programs or to accelerate the cruise missile projects already underway. The choice is not merely technical: it will determine whether Europe develops sovereign, cost-effective capabilities within reach, or risks years of delay and escalating expense on systems that deliver little more than prestige. In any case, there is an urgent need to fill the European DPS capability gap for the 500–1000 km and 2,000 km ranges.
Lessons from Ukraine and Israel
Practical experience has shown that when it comes to penetrating modern air defenses, ballistic missiles are not necessarily at an advantage. Ukraine has offered a stark demonstration of this reality: in heavily defended zones, such as Kyiv and other strategic hubs, incoming ballistic missiles are often intercepted by BMD capable systems like Patriot and SAMP/T. Their success rate drops only on less-protected sectors of the front, where Russia has increasingly relied on Iskander-M and imported North Korean KN-23 missiles to strike Ukrainian positions. The development of the aforementioned FP-5 Flamingo pays testament to this reality, despite Kyiv’s long history of ballistic missile prowess dating back to the Soviet period.
A similar pattern has emerged in the Middle East. Iran’s much-publicized strike on Israel in October 2024, which included dozens of ballistic projectiles aimed at Nevatim airbase, may have looked dramatic on video, but its actual military impact was limited. The missiles, carrying relatively light warheads and travelling on predictable trajectories detected long in advance, failed to inflict meaningful damage on aircraft or core infrastructure.
Furthermore, Europe is still far from industrial-scale production capabilities. At present, two European countries are considering the ballistic options: the UK, with Nightfall—a MoD initiated project for a 600 km range missile—and France with Ariane Group’s Missile Balistique Terrestre project. From an industrial point of view, ArianeGroup has indisputable expertise in ballistic missiles and launchers, but with very limited production runs and low sample-sizes (Ariane space rockets, M51 strategic missiles). It is a very different proposition to move to mass production of several hundred units within a few years for high-intensity warfare. New production units must be developed, supply chains secured, and highly specialized personnel recruited in sectors already under intense pressure because of the new arms race. Moreover, fielding truly effective ballistic missiles, will require high-tech solutions with maneuverable re-entry vehicles (MaRV), whose development and procurement costs will probably make mass purchase by European armed forces unaffordable. All of this applies to both countries, as the UK appears to be starting from scratch in this area.
The case for cruise missiles
The fact is that Europe already possesses a robust industrial base in cruise missile technology. MBDA’s Naval Cruise Missile (MdCN/NCM), deployed from French frigates and submarines, has been combat-proven in Syria. Building on that, MBDA has proposed the Land Cruise Missile (LCM), a ground-launched system with a range of over 1,000 kilometers, terrain-following flight and high survivability, and has touted it as a “unique European sovereign solution.”
The Franco-British Italian Stratus project, also known as Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon (FC/ASW), is advancing towards its development phase. Designed in two complementary variants — one stealthy and subsonic, the other supersonic and maneuverable — the program reflects a deliberate choice to complicate adversary air defenses and to combine range, precision, and stealth, resulting in penetration capability. According to MBDA, Stratus aims to enter service before 2030 and will replace existing SCALP/Storm Shadow inventories.
The Germans, in cooperation with Sweden, developed the Taurus KEPD 350, a long-range air-launched cruise missile designed for precision strike against hardened or deeply buried targets. Modernized versions, such as the Taurus KEPD 350K-2, are being tailored for integration on new aircraft platforms and enhanced with upgraded guidance and penetration capabilities. Like the Land Cruise Missile (LCM), Taurus has been put forward under the ELSA (European Long-range Strike Approach) initiative, which is intended to pool European deep-strike projects into a coherent framework, foster industrial synergies, and ensure collective investment in sovereign capabilities. These European solutions are being actively developed and promoted by manufacturers and states alike, with the explicit goal of reducing dependence on American systems — the most emblematic of which remains the “old” Tomahawk.
Cruise missiles bring operational advantages that ballistic systems cannot easily match. Flying at low altitude and hugging terrain, they reduce warning times and stress adversary radars. They are more adaptable to multiple platforms, from trucks to aircraft to ships, and have a far larger explosive payload. And most importantly, they can be produced and fielded in numbers large enough to matter on tomorrow’s battlefield. Those are the main reasons why resources are being concentrated on cruise missile technologies where Europe has existing expertise, combat-proven track records, and the growing potential to deliver capabilities at scale.
A crucial strategic choice for Europe
The White Paper for European Defense – Readiness 2030 declares, “Europe faces an acute and growing threat. The only way we can ensure peace is to have the readiness to deter those who would do us harm.” This objective requires practicality. The most recent operational experiences in Ukraine, Israel and Pakistan point clearly to the superior techno-operational effectiveness of cruise solutions compared to ballistic ones. This does not definitively rule out ballistic systems, but it highlights that, given Europe’s urgent imperatives to arm itself rapidly, at scale, and at acceptable cost, it is not feasible to develop new ballistic weapons as capable and effective as the cruise solutions already advancing.
But most European states, with the possible exception of Germany, are simply unable to afford redundant capabilities. This is particularly true for countries under economic and budgetary strain such as France and the UK. Commenting on the increase in defense planning in March 2025, Éric Lombard, then France’s Finance Minister, stressed: “Given our current budget situation, these new funds can only be put in place from within our deficit reduction plans.” It would be somewhat surprising if the government of the new Prime Minister, and former Defense Minister, Sébastien Lecornu, were to take a different stance, given that the previous government fell on the budgetary issue.
The military principle of the “concentration of effort” must therefore be applied to those solutions that demonstrably work. Any extravagant or ill-suited novelty risks delaying decisions. The priority should instead be to accelerate the adoption of programs reaching maturity and to push forward the most relevant innovations.
[Image credit: Boevaya mashina, CC BY-SA 3.0 DE, via Wikimedia Commons]
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
Emily Brown is an economic and political strategy analyst with two decades of experience in assessing global geopolitical risks. Her analyses focus on financing strategies in the field of industry and European sovereignty.
