As tensions rise between Cambodia and Thailand, with former Prime Minister and strongman Hun Sen fanning the flames of nationalism over perceived slights and historical grievances, a deeper and far more revealing truth lies beneath the surface: the Thai government is moving—perhaps for the first time in earnest—against the Chinese criminal syndicates that run massive online scam operations along the border. And that, more than any nationalist pride, is what has provoked Hun Sen’s outburst.
Cambodia’s official narrative accuses Thailand of arrogance and disrespect, reviving centuries-old traumas to rouse patriotic sentiment. But the real trigger is the growing Thai resolve to disrupt the financial and logistical networks of Chinese-run scam operations, many of which operate with high-level protection from within the Cambodian state apparatus. These scam networks are not just tolerated—they are financial lifelines for a regime that has long blended politics, patronage, and organized crime.
The Scam Economy: A Parallel State
In recent years, Cambodia has emerged as one of the world’s leading hubs for online scams, many targeting victims across Asia and beyond. According to 2024 and 2025 reports from the U.S. State Department, the United States Institute of Peace, and Amnesty International, Chinese criminal syndicates run vast cyber-fraud operations out of fortified compounds in Sihanoukville, Bavet, Poipet, and other zones near the Thai border. These activities generate an estimated $12.5 billion annually—nearly half of Cambodia’s GDP.
These operations rely heavily on porous borders with Thailand to smuggle in trafficked workers, technical infrastructure, and dirty money. Thai towns like Aranyaprathet and Chong Chom have become essential gateways for these criminal supply chains. The Thai government’s new determination to crack down—partly in response to international scrutiny and domestic embarrassment—poses an existential threat to this system.
And Hun Sen knows it.
Nationalism as a Political Shield
This is not the first time Hun Sen has weaponized nationalism to deflect attention from inconvenient truths. He has repeatedly used anti-Thai sentiment as a political smoke screen during moments of domestic vulnerability.
In 2003, when false reports circulated that a Thai actress had claimed Angkor Wat belonged to Thailand, violent mobs ransacked the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh and attacked Thai businesses. These riots were not spontaneous—they were encouraged by state-controlled media and exploited by Hun Sen to distract from growing internal dissatisfaction and opposition momentum.
In 2011, Hun Sen again stoked nationalist fervor during a military standoff with Thailand over the disputed Preah Vihear temple area. At the time, the ruling CPP faced political challenges and waning popularity. The conflict, while real in origin, was amplified for political ends. By rallying the country around a nationalistic cause, Hun Sen diverted attention from economic frustration, governance failures, and growing popular support for the opposition.
This latest 2025 outburst follows the same formula: because he faces an external threat to his regime’s financial lifelines, Hun Sen stirs up nationalist emotions and shifts the national conversation.
Selective Rage: Why Criticism Never Targets Vietnam
Many Cambodians view Hun Sen’s nationalist rhetoric as selective. While tensions with Thailand often provoke strong public responses and official condemnation, similar issues involving Vietnam rarely receive the same attention.
There has been persistent public concern about the eastern border, particularly in provinces such as Ratanakiri and Svay Rieng, where many Cambodians feel that territorial boundaries have gradually shifted over time. Despite this, expressions of nationalist sentiment in that direction have remained limited or discouraged in official discourse.
This pattern likely stems from historical and political realities. Hun Sen’s rise to power in the 1980s came with the backing of Vietnam, following the fall of the Khmer Rouge. Since then, Cambodia and Vietnam have maintained close diplomatic relations, and the legacy of that support has shaped the political landscape in ways that make public criticism more sensitive.
This double standard reflects cynicism and duplicity. It casts doubt on the sincerity of Hun Sen’s nationalist appeals, suggesting they are driven less by genuine concern for sovereignty than by political calculation—especially when useful for deflecting attention from internal vulnerabilities or shielding vested interests.
A Regime Bankrolled by Crime
The Hun Sen regime’s dependency on illicit Chinese-backed scam operations has intensified in recent years, not only because of the immense profits they generate, but also because traditional sources of regime funding have all but dried up.
Vanishing Natural Resource Revenues
Cambodia once enjoyed a windfall from the extraction of natural resources—notably forestry and land concessions. For years, the regime and its network of loyal tycoons, military officials, and local governors enriched themselves through timber exports, much of it illegally harvested from Cambodia’s once-dense forests.But today, those forests have been largely stripped bare. According to Global Witness and the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), Cambodia has suffered one of the world’s most catastrophic deforestation rates, driven by systemic corruption and state collusion with illegal logging networks. With very little forest cover left to exploit, the logging bonanza that once funded the ruling Cambodian People’s Party’s patronage system has effectively collapsed.
No Land Left to Sell
In parallel with the depletion of Cambodia’s forests, the regime has also exhausted its ability to extract wealth from land concessions. Over the past two decades, millions of hectares of state land have been granted to private companies, many of them foreign, under so-called Economic Land Concessions (ELCs). These allocations have often been based not on development needs or national interest, but on bribes, political loyalty, and crony capitalism. As a result, there is virtually no public land left to be sold or attributed—especially not in a way that would bring in meaningful revenue. What remains is often tied up in long-term concessions that offer little ongoing fiscal return to the state—but much resentment from the displaced and disenfranchised rural poor who have lost access to ancestral farmland and livelihoods.
The Scam Industry Fills the Void
With timber and land revenue declining—and Western aid and investment increasingly conditional on human rights and transparency—the regime turned to more shadowy, cash-rich sources of revenue: Chinese-run online scams.
These criminal operations require no resource base—just impunity and infrastructure. They generate billions in unregulated, liquid cash and offer quick profits to a narrow elite that protects them with military force. This makes the scam economy ideal for a regime no longer able to extract wealth from Cambodia’s natural capital but still needing massive funds to sustain a deep and demanding system of political patronage.
Deception as a Leadership Style
Beyond his dependence on illicit finance and his opportunistic nationalism, Hun Sen is also notorious for his reliance on disloyal and manipulative tactics that have further damaged his credibility in the eyes of the Cambodian public.
One of the most egregious examples involves his habit of secretly recording private conversations with officials presumed to be allies or neutral interlocutors, only to publicly release them when it serves his personal or strategic agenda. These underhanded methods—seen as petty, vindictive, and Machiavellian—have underscored a regime built not on transparency or moral authority, but on manipulation, betrayal, and fear.
For many, this reinforces the view that Hun Sen’s rule is sustained not by genuine legitimacy but by the constant deployment of deception and coercion.
Conclusion: A Dangerous Game of Deflection
The world must see through Hun Sen’s current rhetoric. This is not about patriotism or dignity. It is about preserving power, protecting illicit income, and containing the fallout of a growing international backlash against Cambodia’s role in transnational cybercrime.
Thailand’s crackdown is not an affront to Cambodia’s sovereignty. It is a long-overdue step toward regional accountability. And the international community should stand behind efforts to disrupt criminal networks, even if those efforts disturb the political status quo in Phnom Penh.
In the end, the true threat to Cambodia’s sovereignty is not Thailand—it is the foreign criminal empires and local collaborators that have turned the country into a haven for trafficking, torture, and corruption.
[Photo by UNCTAD, CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons]
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect TGP’s editorial stance.
Sam Rainsy, Cambodia’s finance minister from 1993 to 1994, is the co-founder and acting leader of the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP).
